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RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION AND THE ROLE 
OF ARBITRATION UNDER TITLE VII 
Harry T. Edwards* and Joel H. Kaplan** 
The First Amendment protects one against action by the govern-
ment ..• but it gives no one the right to insist that in the pursuit 
of their own interests others must conform their conduct to his 
own religious necessities . ..• We must accommodate our idio-
syncrasies, religious as well as secular, to the compromises necessary 
in communal life; and we can hope for no reward for the sacrifices 
this may require beyond our satisfactions from within, or our 
expectations of a better world. 
-Judge Learned Hand1 
ONE of the major thrusts of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
2 passed 
by the 88th Congress of the United States after much procrasti-
nation and debate,3 is title VII,4 the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Act, which prohibits selected forms of employment discrimination. 
In drafting title VII, the proponents of the Act were chiefly con-
cerned with racial discrimination in employment.5 In fact, the entire 
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.S. 1962, Cornell University; 
J.D. 1965, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
•• Member of the Illinois Bar. B.S. 1966, Cornell University; J.D. 1969, University 
of Chicago.-Ed. 
1. Otten v. Baltimore&: O.R.R., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953). 
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975-75e, 2000a to h-6 (1964), as 
amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975c, 1975e, 2000d-l, 2000d-5, 2000e, 2000e-14, 2000g (Supp. 
v, 1965-1969). 
3. BNA OPERATIONS MANUAL, THE CIVIL RIGHTS Ac:r OF 1964, at 17-22 (1964) [here• 
inafter OPERATIONS MANUAL]. 
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -15 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-14 (Supp. 
v, 1965-1969). 
5. This emphasis is evident from the language of the report of the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, which states: 
In varying regions of the Country there is discrimination against some minority 
groups. Most glaring, however, is the discrimination against Negroes which exists 
throughout our Nation. Today, more than 100 years after their formal emancipa• 
tion, Negroes, who make up over 10 percent of our population, are by virtue of 
one or another type of d1Scrimination not accorded the rights, privileges, and 
opportunities which are considered to be, and must be, the birthright of all citi-
zens .••• No Bill can or should lay claim to eliminating all of the causes and 
consequences of racial and other types of discrimination against minorities. 
It is, however, possible and necessary for Congress to enact legislation which 
prohibits and provides the means of terminating the most serious types of dis-
crimination. This H.R. 7159., as amended, would achieve in a number of related 
areas. • • • It would prohibit discrimination in employment • • • • 
H.R. 7152, as amended, is a constitutional and desirable means of dealing with 
the injustices and humiliations of racial and other discrimination . • • • 
H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess 18 (1963) (emphasis added). The committee's 
additional report states: 
The bill is a comprehensive measure, but it cannot nor should we expect it 
to be a panacea for all our ills. It will not end racial turmoil. No legislation 
[ 599] 
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Civil Rights Act was written with an eye toward the elimination of 
the "glaring ... discrimination against Negroes which exists through-
out our nation."6 Given this intent, it is not surprising that, during 
the hearings and debates preceding the passage of the Act, Congress 
focused its attention primarily on the race discrimination problem. 
The legislative history is replete with pronouncements, from friend 
and foe alike, concerning the impact of the proposed Act on existing 
patterns of racial prejudice in the United States.7 
Despite this professed primary concern with racial discrimination, 
the legislative authors of title VII intended the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act to be an updated version of what was known in leg-
islative parlance as a "fair employment practices" act.8 Historically, 
fair employment practices (FEP) legislation in the United States has 
typically declared unlawful those forms of employment discrimina-
tion that are based on an individual's race, color, religion, or national 
origin.9 True to this tradition, Congress, without bothering seriously 
to consider or to document the problem, included religious discrimi-
nation as one of the employment practices proscribed by title VII.10 
could do this. Nor can legislation relax all the tensions of our troubled times 
or wipe clean the blot of racial discrimination from our national conscience. 
But this bill can and will commit our Nation to the elimination of many of 
the worst manifestations of racial prejudice. 
H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 2 (1963) (emphasis added). This addi-
tional report goes on to discuss title VII, and after citing evidence on the effects of racial 
discrimination in employment, the report concludes: "More positive and enduring steps 
must be taken, therefore, to cure this evil and before racial unrest eats irretrievably 
into the body of the American industrial system. In response to this need, the Judiciary 
Committee incorporated Title VII into H.R. 7152." Id. at 29. 
6. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1963). 
7. For example, in his message to the Congress dated Feb. 23, 1963, President 
Kennedy urged upon the Congress the need for a broad civil-rights enactment: 
The various steps which have been undertaken or which are proposed in this mes• 
sage do not constitute a final answer to the problems of race discrimination in 
this country. • • • Other measures directed toward these same goals will be 
favorably commented on and supported, as they have in the past-and they will 
be signed if enacted into law. 
109 CoNG. REc. 3245, 3249 (1963). In this same connection, Representative Celler, who 
was both chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary and also the chair-
man of Subcommittee No. 5, which had conducted the hearings on H.R. 7152, com-
mented that: "Perhaps what we are really talking about is the life of a human being 
in the United States, whether a human being because of the color of his skin is being 
deprived ••• of his right to equal opportunity to earn a living •••• " 110 CONG. REc. 
1517 (1964). 
8. OPERATIONS MANUAL, supra note 3, at 18-20. 
9. See, e.g., California Fair Employment Practice Act, CAL. l.ABoR CODE §§ 1410·13 
(West 1959); Illinois Fair Employment Practices Act, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 851-66 
(1961); Michigan State Fair Employment Practices Act, MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. 
§§ 423.301-.311 (1967); Ohio Fair Employment Practices Act, Omo REv. CODE ANN. 
§§ 4112.01-99 (Page 1969). 
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e•2 (1964). That serious documentation of religious•discrim• 
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In section 703 of the Act, model FEP language is used, making it an 
"unlawful employment practice" for "an employer," "a labor organi-
ination problems was wanting in the Judiciary Committee considerations and in the 
subcommittee hearings is evidenced by the following portions of the House debates 
on the bill: 
MR. ABERNATHY [of Mississippi]. I notice in examining the various titles of the 
bill that an attempt is made to eliminate several alleged and various kinds of 
discrimination on the ground of race, color, religion or national origin. Did the 
gentleman's committee hear any testimony on any discrimination practiced against 
any people of this country because of their religion? 
MR. CELLER rof New York who was Judiciary Committee chairman and also 
chairman of Subcommittee No. 5, which conducted the hearings on H.R. 7152]. 
We had testimony concerning religion. We did not have very much testimony of 
discriminations on the grounds of religion. You will notice in one of the titles, 
religion is left out. 
MR. ABERNATHY •••• Who were the people who were being discrimillllted 
against because of religion, of what religious faith? 
MR. CELLER. We had very little evidence-I do not think we had any of it 
insofar as the Committee on the Judiciary is concerned that any particular sect 
or religion had been discriminated against. 
MR. ABERNATHY. Going to Title VI, the gentleman made mention of the fact 
that the word "religion" was removed from Title VI. Can the gentleman tell us 
why it is that the bill attem_Pts only to eliminate the kind of discrimination refer-
red to in Title VI, discrimination with regard to race, color, or national origin 
only, but specifically omits discrimination as to religion? 
MR. RODINO [of New Jersey and member of Subcommittee No. 5 as well as the 
House Committee on the Judiciary]. Mr. Chairman, there is a specific reason why 
religion was left out of Title VI. There was no evidence that there was a need to 
include religion on the question of discrimination. 
Various members of the clergy of the different faiths appeared before the 
committee and testified that religious discrimination was not a question. We 
attempted to meet the problems as they arose. As a result, we did not include 
religion. 
MR: RODINO •••• I quote from the testimony by Father Cronin, as shown on 
page 2030 of the hearings. Father Cronin stated: 
I don't believe that need is very pressing at this time. There are remnants of 
religious discrimination in the United States, but compared to the instant 
problem before us, of the civil rights of the Negro Community, these are very, 
very minor and peripheral and I would not have any feeling that this should 
be broadened; no. 
MR'. .ABERNATHY. I should like to go back to the first question I propounded. 
The gentleman, in answer to my question stated that the committee did take 
testimony that there was discrimination in this country involving religions but 
that no spedfic religion was referred to. If the gentleman is unable to point to 
the page of the bearings specifying which religious faith was discriminated against, 
I hope that at least, in revising his remarks, he will insert in the RECORD the 
faith or faiths he has referred to. Will the gentleman do that? 
MR. CELLER. I shall. 
MR: ROOSEVELT [of California]. ••• I say to my distinguished friend who just 
propounded the question, that information is in the RECORD of the hearings 
of the Committee on Education and Labor. There is specific reference to dis-
crimination because of religion. I will insert it in the RECORD in order that the 
gentlemen may refer to it. 
110 CoNG, R.Ec. 1528-29 (1964) (emphasis added). 
Thus, in the open debates of the Committee of the Whole House for consideration 
of H.R. 7152, it was brought out that the Committee on the Judiciary received very 
little, if any, evidence of religious discrimination. The testimony of Father Cronin 
and other clerics at the Judiciary subcommittee hearings on H.R. 7152 was specifically 
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zation," or "an employment agency" to "discriminate against any 
individual ... because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex 
or national origin."11 
Despite the scant legislative consideration, the addition of reli-
gious discrimination as an unlawful employment practice under title 
VII is not really surprising. The inclusion merely reflects a recogni-
tion that the exercise of religious freedom in the United States has 
always been considered a fundamental right that lies at the heart of 
a free society.12 While this nation was founded on the premise of 
directed at the problem of race relations, and most of the testimony on religious dis• 
crimination indicated that the latter problem was slight and diminishing. See Hearings 
on H.R. 7152 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th 
Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 4, pt. 2, at 1152-59, 1363-67, 1987-2051, 2465-75 (1963). Representative 
Roosevelt's references (110 CONG. REc. 1529 (1964)) to the earlier hearings before the 
Special Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 
offer little amplification of the problem of religious discrimination in employment. 
The most telling testimony given to this latter subcommittee was offered by Joseph 
Levin, president of the Bureau of Jewish Employment Problems. See Hearings on 
Equal Employment opportunity Before the special Subcomm. on Labor of the House 
Comm. on Education and Labor, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 21-32 (1961). Levin gave 
evidence to show that some employment agencies were receiving and filling employers' 
discriminatory job orders. Id. at 22. Typical of the restrictive specifications on the 
job orders were statements such as "This is a gentile firm," "We want Christian 
girls," "Protestant only-no Catholics, Jews, or Orientals." Id. Although Levin admit• 
ted that some of his statistics were outdated (id. at 30), that his sample source was 
very limited (id. at 32), and that the problem had improved in recent years (id. at 
30-31), his testimony nevertheless serves to give some documentation to the problem 
of religious discrimination at the hiring stage of employment. But Levin and the 
other persons who testified before the Special Subcommittee on Labor were uniformly 
convinced that racial, not religious, discrimination should be the primary concern of 
the proposed federal legislation. See the statement of Joseph Levin (id. at 21, 27); the 
statement of Will Maslow, general counsel of American Jewish Congress (id. at 568, 
573); and the statement of Moses K. Kove, chairman of New York Anti-Defamation 
League (id. at 581). With the exception of Levin, all of the witnesses referred to by 
Representative Roosevelt, who appeared before the House Committee on Education 
and Labor, dealt primarily with hiring practices that discriminated against Jews. Id. 
at 568-95. AB a matter of fact, it is not clear that these witnesses really viewed the dis· 
crimination against Jews as an example of "religious discrimination." Mr. Kove, when 
asked what type of federal legislation should be enacted to deal with the problem he 
had described-i.e., discrimination against Jews-replied: "I think specifically you 
ought to have a fair employment practice statute ••• which would make it unlawful 
••• to have any practice of discrimination against anyone on the basis of his race, his 
creed, his ethnic, his origin, and if you will, his age." Id. at 591 (emphasis added). It 
is interesting that Mr. Kove would proscribe "ethnic," but not "religious," discrimina• 
tion. It is also interesting that the witnesses appearing before the Education and Labor 
Committee dealt only with the easy cases of alleged religious discrimination-i.e., 
willful discriminatory hiring and promotion practices-and then mostly with respect 
to discrimination against Jews. No testimony was given concerning the less well-known 
religions such as Seventh Day Adventism, and the discussion of religious discrimina-
tion was not broadened to include problems such as work assignments that conflict with 
religious holidays. 
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964). 
12. See generally P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTlTUTION (1964); Antieau, 
Religious Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 22 NOTRE DAME LAw. 271 (1947); 
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religious freedom,13 it has long struggled with the legal difficulties 
inherent in such freedom.H Indeed, it has been noted that "there are 
few issues so likely to generate heat rather than light as the question 
of the proper line between the realm of the state and that of the 
church."15 In the struggle to define free exercise of religion, a richly 
diverse cast of characters (and religions)-including an unemployed 
South Carolina woman;16 a kosher butcher from Massachusetts;17 
school children from West Virginia,18 New York,19 and New Jersey;20 
a Staten Island landowner;21 a Utah bigamist;22 and a minor public 
official from Maryland,23 to name but a few-have played central 
roles in the judicially directed effort to find the parameters of reli• 
gious freedom in this country. 
The first and fourteenth amendments protect the individual's 
religious freedom against infringement only by governmental, not 
private, action.24 Therefore, the reference to religious discrimination 
in title VII plainly was not intended to be a restatement of the sub. 
stantive constitutional right; rather, the Civil Rights Act is grounded 
in Congress' regulatory power under the commerce clause of the 
Constitution.25 Nevertheless, in the tradition of "heat rather than 
Boudin, Freedom of Thought and Religious Liberty Under the Constitution, 4 
LA.w. GUILD REv. No 3, at 9 (1944): Boyan, Defining Religion in Operational and 
Institutional Terms, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 479 (1968); Clark, Guidelines for the Free 
Exercise Clause, 83 HARv. L. REv. 327 (1969); Deutsch, Concept of Freedom of Religion 
in American Public Law, 44 B.U. L. REv. 287 (1964): Galanter, Religious Freedoms in 
the United States: A Turning Point?, 1966 WIS. L REv. 217; Lake, Freedom To Worship 
Curiously, 1 U. FLA. L. REv. 203 (1948); Schwartz, No Imposition of Religion: The 
Establishment Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692 (1968); Summers, Sources and Limits of 
Religious Freedom, 41 ILL. L. REv. 53 (1946). 
13. See, e.g., U.S. CoNST. amend. I: M. KoNVlTZ, FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES OF A 
FREE PEOPLE 6 (1957) [hereinafter KoNVITZ]; C. ROSSITER, SEEDTIME OF THE R.EPUBUC 
36-59 (1953). 
14. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962): Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 
(1952): West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Reynolds v. 
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
15. P. KURLAND, OF CHuRCH AND STATE AND THE SUPREME COURT 2 (1961). 
16. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
17. Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Mkt., 366 U.S. 617 (1961). 
18. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
19. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
20. Everson v • .Board of Educ., 380 U.S. 1 (1947). 
21. Walz v. Tax Commr., 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
22. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
23. Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). 
24. Otten v. Baltimore&: O.R.R., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953). 
25. 110 CoNG. R.Ec. 1528 (1964) (statement of Rep. Celler). U.S. CoNST. art. 1, § 8, 
provides in part that "the Congress shall have Power ••• to regulate Commerce with 
Foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." 
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light," the prohibition against religious discrimination under title 
VII is no less troublesome, in definition or application, than the 
substantive constitutional right of freedom of religion and the cases 
that have heretofore arisen under the first and fourteenth amend-
ments. 
Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Company26 is a recent case that amply 
demonstrates the confusion that has arisen concerning the scope of 
title VII's proscription of religious discrimination. The legal wrang-
lings in Dewey provide an excellent base point for an analysis of the 
problems underlying this proscription. 
I. THE PROBLEM IN PERSPECTIVE: DEWEY V. 
REYNOLDS METALS COMPANY 
Dewey is a case bristling with analytic difficulty, and it demon-
strates why bewilderment, rather than enlightenment, is usually the 
end product of a statutory effort to protect the free exercise of 
religion in a secular society. More specifically, Dewey attempts to 
resolve the potentially serious tensions between an individual's 
asserted title VII rights and the rights and obligations that arise 
under a collective bargaining contract. 
Dewey, an employee of Reynolds Metals Company (Reynolds or 
Company), had commenced his employment at the Company's Grand 
Rapids, Michigan, plant in 1951. He worked there continuously 
until September 1966, when he was discharged for his refusal to 
perform compulsory overtime work on Sundays or to find a qualified 
replacement to do so. At the time of his discharge, Dewey claimed 
that, as a member of the Faith Reformed Church since 1961,27 his 
religious beliefs prevented him from working on Sundays and also 
from having someone work in his place. 
While employed at the Reynolds Grand Rapids plant, Dewey 
was a member of the production and maintenance bargaining unit 
represented by Local 277 of the United Automobile, Aerospace and 
Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW or Union). In 
1966, the collective bargaining agreement then in existence between 
the UAW and Reynolds provided that "all employees shall be obli-
gated to perform all straight time and overtime work required of 
26. 300 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Mich. 1969), reud., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir.), rehearing 
denied, 429 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 39 U.S.L.W. 3313 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1971) 
(No. 835). See also Jackson v. Veri Fresh Poultry, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 1276 (E.D. La. 1969). 
27. It is curious to note that, prior to 1961, Dewey worked Sunday overtime with-
out protest. Reynolds Metals Co., at 4 CTune 29, 1967) (unpub. arbittation award) (Kahn, 
Al'bitrator) [hereinafter Kahn]. 
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them by the Company except when an employee has a substantial and 
justifiable reason for not working."28 This provision had been in 
force since March 15, 1960. On September 20, 1965, apparently after 
the Union had expressed some concern about the enforcement of 
the compulsory overtime requirement, the Company adopted a new 
procedure that relieved an employee of his obligation to work over-
time if he could obtain "a qualified replacement to perform the 
scheduled overtime."29 
Dewey first ran afoul of the compulsory overtime provision in 
November 1965 when he refused to work on a Sunday, basing his 
refusal on his religious beliefs. Pursuant to the Company's plant 
rules, he received a verbal warning and was advised that a repetition 
could lead to more serious disciplinary action. Between January and 
August 14, 1966, whenever Dewey was scheduled for Sunday overtime, 
he was replaced by another qualified employee, one Jake Zagman.30 
However, when Dewey was scheduled for more Sunday work later in 
August and in September 1966, he told Zagman not to serve again- as 
his replacement. Since, on these later occasions, Dewey did not have a 
"qualified replacement" to perform his scheduled Sunday work and 
since he refused to work himself, he was disciplined by the Company 
for each refusal. Finally, after the third such refusal, Dewey was 
discharged in September 1966. 
Aggrieved by the discharge, Dewey initiated proceedings on a 
broad legal front to obtain vindication. First, pursuant to the con-
tractual grievance procedure, he filed a grievance protesting his 
discharge,31 which culminated in arbitration before Arbitrator Mark 
L. Kahn.32 In his award, dated June 29, 1967, Kahn denied the 
grievance.33 In doing so, he relied in part on a 1965 arbitration award 
at the same plant denying a similar grievance34 and on the withdrawal 
28. Kahn, supra note 27, at 2. 
29. Kahn, supra note 27, at 2. 
30. It is uncertain from the statement of the facts in both the arbitration award 
and the various court decisions whether Zagman replaced Dewey at Zagman's or 
Dewey's initiative. 
31. Dewey':; grievance was presented with that of another employee, Hilbert Schol-
ten, who also refused to work Sunday overtime because of his religious beliefs. 
Scholten's three-day disciplinary suspension, like Dewey's discharge, was upheld. 
32. Kahn, a well-known and respected arbitrator, is not unmindful of individual 
employee rights. See, e.g., Kahn, Seniority Problems in Business Mergers, 8 Toro. &: LAB. 
REL. REv. 361 (1955). 
33. Kahn, supra note 27. 
M. The 1965 award upheld a warning notice to an employee who refused to work 
on Sunday because of his religious beliefs. Reynolds Metals Co. Oune 3, 1965) (unpub. 
arbitration award) (Haughton, Arbitrator). 
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of another such grievance by the Union in 1966.35 Arbitrator Kahn, 
in sustaining the Company's position, rendered two basic holdings: 
first, that the "substantial and justifiable reason" exception to the 
agreement, while justifying an occasional refusal to work overtime 
based on one's religious convictions, could not be used as a basis to 
refuse all Sunday work;36 and, second, that Dewey had an obligation 
under the contract "to utilize the established replacement procedure 
in order to minimize or perhaps avoid entirely the need to confront 
the Company with a refusal of Sunday work."37 
Contemporaneously with the filing of his contract grievance, 
Dewey turned to the Michigan Civil Rights Commission,38 which in 
December, 1966 refused to issue a complaint of religious discrimina-
tion against Reynolds. The commission ruled: 
The findings indicate that the claimant despite due notice of 
overtime requirements by the company and the applicable Col-
lective Bargaining Agreement provisions, continued to refuse to 
perform scheduled overtime work on Sundays and took the posi-
tion that his right to continued employment while following his 
religious belief without interference was an absolute right. 
The Commission has previously ruled that where the normal 
work week and foreseeable overtime requirements are prescribed in 
a Collective Bargaining Agreement, that absent [an] intent on the 
part of respondent to discriminate on religious grounds, an employee 
is not entitled to demand any alteration in such requirement to 
accommodate his religious beliefs. 
The investigation did not reveal any intent on the part of the 
respondent to discriminate on religious grounds and it is, therefore, 
recommended that this application for the issuance of a complaint 
be denied for lack of probable cause.39 
35. Whether the grievant or the union withdrew the grievance is unknown, but 
for purposes of § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 
(1964), it makes no difference, unless the union's withdrawal constituted a breach of 
its duty to fair representation. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). For title VII purposes, 
however, the difference is arguably important. See pt. V. infra. 
36. Kahn, supra note 27, at 7. 
37. Kahn, supra note 27, at 7. 
38. The Michigan Civil Rights Commission is charged with the responsibility of 
enforcing the Michigan Fair Employment Practices Act, MICH. COMP. LAW ANN. §§ 
423.301-.311 (1955). With respect to religious discrimination in employment, the Michi-
gan statute provides in pertinent part: 
It shall be an unfair employment practice: 
(a) For any employer, because of the race, color, religion, national origin or 
ancestry of any individual, to refuse to hire or otherwise to discriminate 
against him with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions or privileges of em-
ployment, or any matter, directly or indirectly related to employment, except 
where based on bona fide occupational qualification. 
MrcH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 423.303(3}(a) (1967). 
39. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 327 (6th Cir. 1970). 
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Rebuffed by the Michigan Civil Rights Commission, Dewey re-
quested the United States Office of Federal Contract Compliance to 
review his charges of religious discrimination. That body also found 
Dewey's charges to be baseless.40 
Turning to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC or Commission), Dewey finally found success in January 1967. 
Overruling the recommendations of its regional director, the EEOC 
found that there was probable cause to believe that Reynolds had 
engaged in unlawful employment practices.41 Accordingly, the Com-
mission authorized Dewey to bring an action in federal district 
court.42 
At the time when the EEOC first considered the Dewey matter, 
its guidelines on religious discrimination provided that an employer 
should try to "accommodate" the reasonable religious needs of its 
employees when such accommodation could be accomplished without 
serious inconvenience to the conduct of the business.43 Subsequently, 
40. 429 F.2d at 327. 
41. 429 F.2d at 327. 
42. Although the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Com-
mission) "authorized" the bringing of the Dewey action in federal district court, it 
should be noted that the case authority construing the enforcement procedures ap-
plicable to an alleged title VII violation does not make such "authorization" or 
"permission" an absolute prerequisite or condition precedent to maintaining such an 
action. A claimant may not maintain his suit prior to giving the EEOC the statutorily 
required "opportunity" to investigate and conciliate, but the weight of authority holds 
that this opportunity, with or without an affirmative EEOC finding of "reasonable 
cause" or EEOC notification of "inability to obtain voluntary compliance," will be 
sufficient to establish jurisdiction in a federal court. Beverly v. Lone Star Lead Constr. 
Co., 3 FAIR EMPL. PRAc. CAs. 74 (5th Cir. Jan. 19, 1971). Even considering the contrary 
authority, it is clear that something less than a Commission "authorization" is re-
quired to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal district courts to protect rights secured 
under title VII. See Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 406 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1969); 
Johnson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 405 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 
394 U.S. 918 (1969); Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968); 
Stebbins v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 382 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 
U.S. 910 (1968); Mondy v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 271 F. Supp. 258 (E.D. La. 1967), 
revd. and remanded on other grounds, 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968). But see Cox v. 
United States Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1969); Kendrick v. American Bakery 
Co., 69 L.R.R.M. 2012 (N.D. Ga. 1968). 
43. The 1966 EEOC guidelines on religious discrimination read as follows: 
(a) (1) Several complaints filed with the Commission have raised the question 
whether it is discrimination on account of religion to discharge or to refuse to 
hire a person whose religious observances re9.uire that he take time off during the 
employer's regular workweek. These complaints arise in a variety of contexts, 
but typically involve employees who regularly observe Saturdays as the Sabbath or 
who observe certain special holidays during the year. 
(2) The Commission believes that the duty not to discriminate on religious 
grounds includes an obligation on the part of the employer to accommodate to 
the reaso;1able religious needs of employees and, in some cases, prospective em-
ployees where such accommodation can be made without serious inconvenience 
to the conduct of the business. 
(3) However, the Commission believes that an employer is free under Title 
vn to establish a normal workweek (including paid holidays) generally ap• 
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in July 1967, the Commission's guidelines were substantially 
changed to shift to the employer "the burden of proving that un-
due hardship renders the required accommodations to the reli-
gious needs of the employee unreasonable."44 
plicable to all employees, notwithstanding that this schedule may not operate 
with uniformity in its effect upon the religious observances of his employees, For 
example, an employer who is closed for business on Sunday does not discriminate 
merefy because he requires that all his employees be available for work on Satur• 
day. Likewise, an employer who closes his business on Christmas or Good Friday 
is not thereby obligated to give time off with pay to Jewish employees for Rosh 
Hashanah or Yom Kippur. 
(b) While the question of what accommodation by the employer may reason• 
ably be required must be decided on the pecular facts of each case, the 'following 
guidelines may prove helpful: 
(1) An employer may permit absences from work on religious holidays, with or 
without pay, but must treat all religions with substantial uniformity in this 
respect. However, the closing of a business on one religious holiday creates no 
obligation to permit time off from work on another. 
(2) An employer, to the extent he can do so without serious inconvenience to 
the conduct of his business, should make a reasonable accommodation to the needs 
of his employees and applicants for employment in connection with special reli-
gious holiday observances. 
(3) The employer may prescribe the normal work week and foreseeable over-
time requirements, and, absent an intent on the part of the employer to dis· 
criminate on religious grounds, a job applicant or employee who accepted the 
job knowing or having reason to believe that such requirements would conflict 
with his religious obligations is not entitled to demand any alteration in such 
requirements to accommodate his religious needs. 
(4) Where an employee has previously been employed on a schedule which 
does not conflict with his religious obligations and it becomes necessary to alter 
his work schedule, the employer should attempt to achieve an accommodation 
so as to avoid a conflict. However, an employer 1s not compelled to make such an 
accommodation at the expense of serious inconvenience to the conduct of his 
business or disproportionate allocation of unfavorable work assignments to other 
employees. 
EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 31 Fed. Reg. 8370 (1966). 
44. The 1967 EEOC guidelines on religious discrimination read as follows: 
(a} Several complaints filed with the Commission have raised the question 
whether it is discrimination on account of religion to discharge or refuse to hire 
employees who regularly observe Friday evening and Saturday, or some other day 
of the week, as the Sabbath or who observe certain special religious holidays 
during the year and, as a consequence, do not work on such days. 
(b) The Commission believes that the duty not to discriminate on religious 
grounds, required by section 703(a}(l) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, includes 
an obligation on the part of the employer to make reasonable accommodations to 
the religious needs of employees and :erospective employees where such accommo• 
dations can be made without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's 
business. Such undue hardship, for example, may exist where the employee's 
needed work cannot be performed by another employee of substantially similar 
qualifications during the period of absence of the Sabbath observer. 
(c) Because of the particularly sensitive nature of discharging or refusing to 
hire an employee or applicant on account of his religious beliefs, the employer 
has the burden of proving that an undue hardship renders the required accommo-
dations to the religious needs of the employee unreasonable. 
(d) The Commission will review each case on an individual basis in an effort 
to seek an equitable application of these guidelines to the variety of situations 
which arise due to the varied religious practices of the American people. 
EEOC Guidelines on Discrilnination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1970) 
(emphasis added). Between the issuance of the June 15, 1966, guidelines and their 
replacement by the new guidelines on July 10, 1967, the EEOC General Counsel 
issued the following interpretative opinions regarding religious discrimination ques-
tions: an employment practice tbat discriminates against atheistic beliefs violates title 
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After the EEOC had made its finding of probable cause in the 
Dewey case, and after the issuance of the unfavorable award by 
Arbitrator Kahn in June 1967, Dewey filed suit in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Michigan, alleging that 
Reynolds was guilty of religious discrimination under title VII. The 
court, in a series of three decisions,45 dismissed Reynolds' contrary 
contentions and ruled in Dewey's favor. These three decisions, plus 
the two rendered on the appeal to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit,46 aptly demonstrate the legal difficulties raised 
by a requirement that a secular business institution adjust its opera-
tions in order to accommodate the varying religious needs of its 
workers. Moreover, these decisions illustrate the conflict between the 
guarantee of individual rights under title VII and the subjugation of 
these asserted rights in the collective bargaining context. 
In its first ruling in the case, the district court denied Reynolds' 
motion to dismiss.47 In support of its motion, Reynolds had argued 
that, by filing a grievance under the contractual grievance procedure, 
Dewey had made a final and binding election of remedies. Rejecting 
this contention, the court emphasized that the issues treated by the 
arbitrator were wholly different from those raised in a title VII suit.48 
The court noted that the arbitrator had properly limited himself to 
the contract and had never touched the issues raised under either the 
Civil Rights Act or the first amendment.49 The district court also 
VII since the United States Constitution embraces religious liberty, includes the con-
cept of "freedom from belief" as well as "freedom of belief" (Opinion Letter of EEOC 
General Counsel, Aug. 2, 1966, in BNA LAB. POLICY &: PRAC. 401:3013 (1966)); the re-
quirement that employers treat all religions with "substantial uniformity" in granting 
absences from work due to religious holidays does not prescribe precise mathematical 
accuracy, and, thus, an employer does not violate title VII by giving Jewish employees 
one or two religious holidays with pay while giving Christian employees none, when 
the latter do receive certain legal holidays with pay that are also Christian holidays 
(Opinion Letter of EEOC General Counsel, Oct. 3, 1966, in BNA LAB. POLICY &: PRAC. 
401:3026 (1966)); an employer violates title VII by not allowing substantially the same 
amount of time off with substantially equivalent compensation when Jewish employees 
are granted six paid religious holidays, but Christian employees are allowed only one 
(Opinion Letter of EEOC General Counsel, July 25, 1966, in BNA LAB. POLICY &: PRAc. 
401:11010 (1966)); and an employer does not violate title VII by discharging and refusing 
to rehire employees for failure to join a union in a plant covered by a lawful union 
shop agreement, even though an employee claims that joining a labor union would be 
contrary to his religious beliefs (Opinion Letter of EEOC Acting General Counsel, Jan. 
26, 1967, in BNA LAB. POLICY &: PRAc. 401:3033 (1967)). 
45. See notes 47, 52, &: 58 infra. 
46. 429 F.2d 324- (6th Cir.), rehearing denied, 429 F.2d 334- (6th Cir. 1970). See 
notes 61-72 infra. 
47. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 291 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Mich. 1968). 
48. 291 F. Supp. at 789. 
49. The district court never fully discussed how the first amendment is relevant in 
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reasoned that Dewey "should not be penalized for first proceeding 
with his contractual remedies through the arbitration process, as 
preferred and indeed mandated by federal labor law."150 The court 
buttressed this latter conclusion by reasoning that, since the arbitra-
tion proceeding was not purely private but served also as a substitute 
for traditional judicial remedies, the first amendment was applicable; 
the court held, therefore, that "[t]he right in question, freedom to 
exercise one's religion, is too precious to require plaintiff to accept 
an arbitrator's decision regarding it."51 
In its second decision, 52 the district court found that the Company 
had clearly discriminated against Dewey. In reaching this result, the 
court placed principal reliance on two sources: first, the United 
States Supreme Court's decision in Sherbert v. Verner,53 striking 
down as unconstitutional South Carolina's scheme of unemployment 
compensation because it denied benefits to a Seventh Day Adventist 
who had refused as a matter of religious principle to work on 
Saturday; and, second, the more recent 1967 EEOC guidelines re-
quiring an employer to make reasonable accommodations to the 
religious needs of its employees unless such accommodations impose 
an "undue hardship" on the employer.54 The court ruled that Rey-
nolds had discriminated against Dewey because its compulsory 
overtime requirement had the effect of forcing Dewey to choose 
between his religion and his job; this discriminatory impact, the 
court reasoned, violated the Supreme Court's holding in Sherbert. 
Moreover, the court held that Reynolds had not carried its burden 
of proof under the EEOC guidelines; that is, that Reynolds' evidence 
that ten years ago it had experienced some difficulty in scheduling 
production on Sunday was not sufficient to demonstrate a current 
business "hardship." In addition, the court emphasized that the 
Company rule that allowed Dewey to find a qualified replacement 
was an insufficient accommodation, since a fundamental part of 
the context of private employment and in the absence of governmental action; the 
Sixth Circuit was no more helpful in its off-handed dismissal of any first amendment 
considerations because of the lack of state action. 429 F .2d at 329. But cf. Linscott 
v. Miller Falls Co., 316 F. Supp. 1869 (D. Mass. 1970). In any event, the district court's 
reliance on the first amendment in the arbitration context, 291 F. Supp. at 789-90, has 
serious implications-such as the incorporation of constitutional guarantees into arbi-
tration-that certainly are not adequately dealt with in its opinion. Cf. Edwards, Due 
Process Considerations in Labor Arbitration, 25 .ARB. J. (n.s.) 141 (1970). 
50. 291 F. Supp. at 789. 
51. 291 F. Supp. at 790. 
52. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 300 F. Supp. 709 (W .D. Mich 1969). 
53. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
54. See note 44 supra. 
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Dewey's religious beliefs prohibited him from asking anyone else to 
work on Sunday.15 is 
The fashioning of proper relief posed some difficulty for the 
court, because it recognized that the 1966 EEOC guidelines, 56 which 
were in effect at the time when Reynolds discharged Dewey, pre-
scribed a scheme for reasonable accommodation that was far less 
stringent than the 1967 guidelines relied on by the court. In effect, 
the court suggested, without so stating, that Reynolds' conduct was 
not an unlawful employment practice under the 1966 guidelines. 
The court therefore ruled that, while reinstatement was appropriate, 
back pay would be accorded Dewey only for the period of his dis-
charge subsequent to August I, 1967, when Reynolds should have 
had notice of the new guidelines. 57 Furthermore, by failing to strike 
down the compulsory overtime provision, the court left it to the 
parties to work out a reasonable accommodation for the future. 
In its third decision in the case, 58 the district court refused to 
stay Dewey's reinstatement, although it stayed the money judgment, 
and ruled, again adversely to Reynolds, that good faith on the part of 
the employer is not a viable defense to a suit brought under title 
VII.150 It found that Reynolds had engaged in an unlawful employ-
ment practice by intentionally discharging Dewey for his refusal to 
work Sunday and to find a replacement. 60 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit, in a two-to-one decision, reversed.61 The Sixth Circuit found 
Sherbert inapplicable because it involved state action, whereas this 
case involved private action.62 It also found inapposite the 1967 
EEOC guidelines relied on by the district court, ruling that the 1966 
guidelines, in effect at the time of Dewey's discharge, were con-
55. Dewey claimed that asking someone else to work on Sunday was as much a 
sin as was working himself. !100 F. Supp. at 715. 
56. See note 4!1 supra. 
57. !100 F. Supp. at 715 nl. The present guidelines became effective July 10, 1967. 
The court never explained, however, why an award for back pay of the entire period 
could not have been ordered on the basis of Sherbert v. Verner, which the court relied 
on along with the guidelines. Perhaps the district court's reliance on Sherbert was 
more apparent than real. 
58. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., !104 F. Supp. 1116 (W.D. Mich. 1969). 
59. 304 F. Supp. at 1121, See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1964). Cf. Richards v. Griffith 
Rubber Mills, !100 F. Supp. !1!18 (D. Ore. 1969). 
60. !104 F. Supp. at 1121. The district court's treatment of the issue of intent was 
less than satisfying. Implicit from the court's sparse discussion is the adoption of the 
intent standard that is applied under the NLRA, which is the common-law test of 
natural and foreseeable consequences. See Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 847 U.S. 
17 (1954). 
61. 429 F.2d !124 (6th Cir. 1970). 
62. 429 F.2d at 329, 
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trolling.63 The court held that, in any event, the Company rule that 
permitted Dewey to find a replacement was a reasonable accommoda-
tion to Dewey's religious beliefs even under the new guidelines and 
thus Reynolds was under no present duty to alter its rules.6i The 
court also disagreed with, and expressed grave concern about, the 
district court's finding that the Company had intentionally engaged 
in an unlawful employment practice, especially in light of the fact 
that the Michigan Civil Rights Commission, the Office of Federal 
Contract Compliance, the arbitrator, and the regional director of 
the EEOC had all opined that Reynolds had not discriminated 
against Dewey.65 The Sixth Circuit also amplified its dissatisfaction 
with the trial court's ruling on the intent issue by referring to the fact 
that the district court had based its decision, in large part, on the ex 
post facto application of the new EEOC guidelines.66 
In addressing itself to the issue of discrimination, the court of 
appeals declared that title VII did not ban neutral actions by an 
employer, such as the compulsory overtime requirement in issue in 
Dewey. The court ruled that the ban extended only to those actions 
taken with the intent of denying employment opportunity because 
of the enumerated proscribed criteria. In this regard the court said: 
The reason for Dewey's discharge was not discrimination on 
account of his religion; it was because he violated the provisions of 
the collective bargaining agreement entered into by his union with 
his employer, which provisions were applicable equally to all em-
ployees. The violation consisted not only of his refusing to work 
on Sundays, but also his refusing to arrange for a replacement, 
which was an alternate procedure. He did arrange for five replace-
ments, but later refused even to do this, claiming that it was a sin. 
He apparently did not regard it as sinful for him to collect wages 
from an employer who was compelled to schedule overtime produc-
tion in order to meet its contractual commitments and eventually 
meet its payroll. 
To accede to Dewey's demands would require Reynolds to dis-
criminate against its other employees by requiring them to work 
on Sundays in the place of Dewey, thereby relieving Dewey of his 
GOntractual obligation. This would constitute unequal administra-
tion of the collective bargaining agreement among the employees, 
and could create chaotic personnel problems and lead to grievances 
and additional arbitrations.67 
63. 429 F .2d at 329. 
64. 429 F.2d at 331. 
65. 429 F.2d at 331. 
66. 429 F.2d at 330. 
67. 429 F.2d at 330. 
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On the issue of election of remedies, the Sixth Circuit ruled that 
Dewey had made a final and binding election of remedies by taking 
his grievance to arbitration.68 Finding it anomalous that, under the 
Steelworkers Trilogy, 69 the employer would be unable to relitigate 
the discrimination question if the arbitrator had ruled against it, the 
court ruled: "Where the grievances are based on an alleged civil 
rights violation, and the parties consent to arbitration by a mutually 
agreeable arbitrator, in our judgment the arbitrator has a right to 
finally determine them."70 
On rehearing, the court of appeals again split two to one in 
reversing the district court decision. 71 Emphasizing that the Act does 
not require accommodation, the majority reiterated its opinion that 
title VII prohibits only discrimination by design, rather than by 
effect, and that under this standard the compulsory-overtime provi-
sion of the contract discriminated "against no one."72 On the issue 
of election of remedies, the majority noted two recent Fifth Circuit 
cases73 that were at odds with its previous decision, but nevertheless 
refused to reverse itself on the question. 
Dewey thus brings into sharp focus some of the serious legal 
questions that are necessarily involved in the enforcement of the title 
VII prohibition of religious discrimination in employment. What 
follows is an examination of the most important of these difficulties. 
68. 429 F.2d at 331-32. 
69. The Steelworkers Trilogy consists of three cases decided by the Supreme Court 
in 1960, which defined the scope of arbitration of labor contract disputes: Steelworkers 
v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Steelworkers v. Warrior &: Gulf Nav. Co., 363 
U.S. 574 (1960); Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &: Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). 
70. 429 F.2d at 331. Judge Combs, dissenting from the Sixth Circuit's decision, 
emphasized the deference to be shown an administrative agency's interpretation 
of the act it administers and noted that the prior EEOC guidelines also required 
an "accommodation," albeit far less demanding than the accommodation mandated by 
the 1967 guidelines. 429 F.2d at 333. Reiterating that Dewey's religious beliefs pre-
cluded his finding a replacement to work on Sunday, and finding no evidence offered 
by Reynolds to indicate undue hardship, Judge Combs reasoned that Dewey's dis-
charge violated title VII. 429 F.2d at 333-34. He also disagreed with that portion of 
the majority opinion that ruled on the issue of election of remedies, noting that 
Dewey's rights under the contract and under title VII were separate and distinct; 
he noted that the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Bowe v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969), had ruled that a plaintiff could utilize dual 
prosecutions so long as the windfall of duplicate relief was not allowed. 429 F.2d at 
334. 
71. 429 F.2d at 334. In the interim, Judge Combs had resigned from the federal 
bench to run for Governor of Kentucky; Judge McCree replaced Judge Combs on the 
panel. Judge McCree dissented from the denial of rehearing. 429 F.2d at 337. 
72. 429 F.2d at 336. 
73. Hutchings v. United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970); Culpepper 
v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970). 
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II. THE DEFINITION OF RELIGION 
One problem that both courts avoided in Dewey was the defini-
tion of the term "religion." The district court found that there was 
"no dispute as to the sincerity" of Dewey's religious beliefs,n and 
this finding was not overturned on appeal. The court's finding is 
significant not because it was determinative in Dewey, but rather 
because it raises the question whether an employer could ever 
launch a successful attack on the "religious" character of an asserted 
religion or on the sincerity of an individual's professed religious be-
liefs. If religion is indeed to be defined with reference to an individ-
ual's "views of his relations to his Creator,''75 then there is no purely 
objective standard available to judge the existence of the thing 
against which discrimination is prohibited. Since religion under the 
law may involve nothing more than a "deeply and sincerely"76 held 
belief, which may be "purely ethical or moral in source and con-
tent, "77 the mere assertion of belief will serve as prima fade evidence 
of its genuineness. Unless the employer can point to some previous 
specific and overt behavior that is patently inconsistent with the 
individual's professed beliefs, it is questionable whether he can suc-
cessfully challenge the employee's sincerity. Even overt conduct may 
be insufficient, because consistency of conduct cannot be the test of 
sincerity of belief since, under the law, the individual "must accom-
modate [his] idiosyncrasies, religious as well as secular, to the com-
promises necessary in communal life.''78 
The cornerstone to any discussion of law and religion may be 
found in the often-quoted words of Justice Miller: "The law knows 
no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the estab-
lishment of no sect.''79 Justice Jackson, in West Virginia State Board 
of Education v. Barnette,80 put forward this same proposition in his 
highly stylized prose: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional 
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what 
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters 
of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith 
74. 300 F. Supp. at 711. 
75. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890). 
76. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970). 
77. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970). 
78. Otten v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953). 
79. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 728 (1871). 
80. 319 U.S. 624 (l943). 
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therein."81 Freedom of religion, Justice Douglas emphasized in 
United States v. Ballard,82 
embraces the right to maintain theories of life and death and of the 
hereafter which are rank heresy to followers of the orthodox faiths 
.... Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put 
to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious ex-
periences which are as real as life to some may be incomprehensible 
to others. Yet the fact that they may be beyond the ken of mortals 
does not mean that they can be made suspect before the law.83 
Given these judicial pronouncements, it is not surprising that the 
Supreme Court has declared that "it is no business of courts to say 
that what is a religious practice or activity for one group is not reli-
gion under the protection of the First Amendment."84 
Built on the establishment and free exercise clauses of the first 
amendment, this broad laissez-faire definition of religion is a reflec-
tion not only of the tolerance accorded differing beliefs in this 
country, but of the virtual impossibility of distinguishing between 
sincere and insincere religious beliefs. Based more on faith than on 
reason, all religion, by definition, is somewhat irrational. For this 
reason, erratic and inconsistent courses of action are meaningless in 
testing the sincerity of one's religious beliefs; hence, the "reasonable 
man," that amorphous, all-purpose source of guidance, is no help. 
Perhaps no case better illustrates the irrationality of sincere religious 
belief than Dewey itself.85 Prior to his conversion in 1961 to the Faith 
Reformed Church, Dewey worked Sunday overtime without objec-
tion. Afterward, however, he perceived Sunday work as sinful and 
stubbornly refused to perform it. Dewey did, however, allow Zagman 
to replace him five times, until he came to view this substitution as 
a sin also and told Zagman not to serve as his replacement. It is exas-
perating to ask how Zagman's replacement of Dewey was religiously 
acceptable on August 14, 1966, but not so two weeks later. Although 
Dewey's actions appear to brim with irrationality, they are no more 
unreasonable than the practices of adherents of other religious sects. 
For example, how can one rationally explain the practice of many 
persons of the Jewish faith who maintain kosher homes, but who 
81. 319 U.S. at 642. 
82. 322 U.S. 78 (1944). 
83. 322 U.S. at 86-87. 
84. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953). 
85. Dewey is discussed in pt. I. supra. 
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eat nonkosher food regularly at restaurants? Each has, after all, but 
one stomach. 
In short, since religion is based on a sometimes irrational faith, 
consistency of belief cannot serve as a litmus paper test of conviction 
or hypocrisy. The sincerity of one's religious beliefs simply cannot be 
measured by mere mortals. As one commentator has aptly put it: 
How sincere in his religious beliefs is a person who, while pro-
fessing belief in the immortality of his soul and in rewards and 
punishments in the next world seemingly spends his time doing 
nothing but accumulating the things you can't take with you, or a 
preacher who in the same breath will say that God is love and that 
sinners are in the hands of an angry God? Who can weigh and 
measure the quantity and quality in professions of religious faith?86 
Moreover, religious sincerity and religious verity are not sepa-
rate and distinct; examination of the former must inevitably lead to 
scrutiny of the latter.87 Indeed, it seems somewhat fatuous to talk, 
as do the EEOC guidelines, 88 of reasonable accommodation without 
first asking against whose standards the accommodation should be 
measured. Applying its own standard of reasonableness, the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals felt, and not ·without some justification, 
that the scheme utilized by Reynolds that allowed employees to find 
a replacement for Sunday overtime was more than reasonable. On 
the other hand, as the district court quite properly pointed out, 
under Dewey's religious scruples, which viewed allowing another 
person to work in one's place as a sin equivalent to doing the work 
oneself, Reynolds' accommodation was anything but reasonable. 
The difficulty the courts have in judging the sincerity of an in-
dividual's religious beliefs, and their consequent general refusal to do 
so, is compounded by the expansive definition recently accorded the 
term "religion" by the Supreme Court in a somewhat different context. 
In Welsh v. United States,89 the Court was confronted with the defi-
nition of "religious" under section 6G) of the Military and Selective 
Service Act of 1967, which provides for the exemption of conscien-
tious objectors from the draft.90 Quoting its earlier holding in United 
States v. Seeger91 that traditional or parochial concepts of religion-
including belief in a Supreme Being-result in too narrow a defini-
86. KONVITZ, supra note 13, at 101. 
87. See, e.g., United States v. :Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 93, 95 (1944) Gustice Jackson, 
dissenting). 
88. See note 44 supra. 
89. 398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
90. 50 U.S.C. App. § 4560) (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
91. 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
March 1971] Religious Discrimination 617 
tion, the Court in Welsh reiterated the Seeger definition of the term 
"religious": "The test might be stated in these words: A sincere and 
meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place 
parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for 
the exemption comes within the statutory definition."92 The Court 
then clarified this definition by stating that 
[m]ost of the great religions of today and of the past have embodied 
the idea of a Supreme Being or a Supreme Reality-a God-who 
communicates to man in some way a consciousness of what is right 
and should be done, of what is wrong and therefore should be 
shunned. If an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs which 
are purely ethical or moral in source and content but which never-
theless impose upon him a duty of conscience to refrain from par-
ticipating in any war at any time, those beliefs certainly occupy in 
the life of that individual "a place parallel to that filled by ... God" 
in traditionally religious persons. Because his beliefs function as a 
religion in his life, such an individual is as much entitled to a 
"religious" conscientious objector exemption under § 60) as is some-
one who derives his conscientious opposition to war from traditional 
religious convictions.ss 
Although the Supreme Court in Welsh limited the scope of the 
religious exemption to exclude those persons "whose beliefs are not 
deeply held and those whose objection to war does not rest at all 
upon moral, ethical, or religious principle but instead rests solely 
upon considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expediency,"94 the 
Court's statutory interpretation nevertheless gave such a broad defini-
tion to "religion" that it may have opened a Pandora's box 
of analogous definitional problems under title VII with respect 
to religion. It is true that Welsh, in dealing with the con-
scientious-objector exemption from the draft, applies a statutory 
scheme that is entirely different than the Civil Rights Act. However, 
it is significant that both Welsh and Dewey deal with federal legisla-
tive schemes that, in effect, add flesh to the bare bones of the first 
:::mendment. In each case the statute seeks to guarantee protection 
for religious beliefs-protection against the draft requirement in 
Welsh and protection against employment discrimination in Dewey. 
Since the definition of "religious" or "religion" is crucial to an 
explanation of the scope of the statutory protections under both the 
Military and Selective Service Act and title VII, it would not be 
92. 898 U.S. at 8!19. 
98. 898 U.S. at 840. 
94. !198 U.S. at 842-48. 
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surprising to find the broad Welsh definition adopted in future title 
VII cases. 
For title VII purposes, the comprehensive definition of religion 
in Welsh is no doubt quite proper;95 however, a total incorporation 
of the broad Welsh definition of religion with no concomitant re-
striction in the statutory construction of "discrimination" or "intent" 
would produce some horrendous results in religious-discrimination 
cases under title VII. For example, an employee could well feel that 
going bowling every Wednesday night is central to his existence and 
well-being, and that for him not to do so would constitute a sin. Is 
he required to work overtime Wednesday nights? Absurd? Yes, but 
is this example any more absurd than Dewey's belief? What if, in-
stead of praying every Wednesday night, an employee believes that 
working overtime in itself is sinful; or an employee shows up for 
work only on those days when he doesn't hear the "call"? More 
realistically, must an employer, under title VII, allow a Moslem em-
ployee to pray the five times a day required by his faith? What if we 
call the employee's action a slowdown instead of prayer? This short 
series of hypotheticals, while at first blush rather nonsensical, is not 
so unrealistic. To many, Robert Dewey might appear to be an excep-
tion. But given a sufficiently expansive definition of religion and the 
utter futility of challenging the sincerity of an individual's religious 
beliefs, there will be countless Robert Deweys in this diverse coun-
try.DB 
Arbitrator Kahn indicated in his decision that he was troubled by 
these problems. He observed: 
It is worth noting, perhaps, that Article IX, Section 3 [of the 
collective bargaining agreement], applies explicitly to "all straight 
time and overtime work." Suppose that an employee decided to join 
a religious organization with a Wednesday Sabbath, and that he 
thereafter refused to work on Wednesdays. It would be obvious, I 
think, that the Company could properly find this employee in vio-
95. That title VII meant to incorporate a broad definition of religion is beyond 
dispute. This conclusion is supported by the legislative history, which indicates that 
an amendment to exempt atheists from the protection of title VII was defeated. See II0 
CONG. R.Ec. 6568, 7217 (1964). See also Opinion Letter of EEOC General Counsel, Aug. 
2, 1966, in BNA LAB. PoLicY & PRAc. 401:3013 (1966); Note, Title VII-Religious Dis-
crimination in Employment-Is "Effect on Individual Religious Belief' Discrimination 
Based on Religion Under the Civil Rights Act of 1961-1, 16 WAYNE L. R.Ev. 327, 333 
(1969). 
96. See, e.g., A.C. Rochat Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 421 (1967), in which bargaining with 
a union was claimed to contravene the religious beliefs of an employer. Cf. Church of 
Scientology v. Richardson, 39 U.SL.W. 2402, 2403 (9th Cir. Jan. II, 1971) (holding 
that an instrument allegedly essential to the practice of Scientology could be barred 
from importation upon administrative determination as a misbranded device without 
evaluation of the "truth or falsity of any related 'religious' claims'?• 
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lation of Rule II; yet, the language of this Agreement makes no 
distinction for this purpose between straight time and overtime 
work assignments.97 
On rehearing, the Sixth Circuit also alluded to this and other un-
orthodox religious practices and ruled: "The employer ought not 
to be forced to accommodate each of the varying religious beliefs and 
practices of his employees."98 
In sum, the necessarily broad definition of religion has a serious 
impact on the sweep and possible effect of asserted title VII rights. In 
defining the scope of those rights, this expansive and malleable 
definition of religion cannot be ignored. Indeed, it serves to buttress 
the argument, to which we next turn, that the definition of "dis-
crimination" under title VII should be narrow and encompass only 
intentional discrimination, rather than be the broader one of reason-
able accommodation or the still broader one of discrimination by 
effect. 
JI!. DEFINITION OF DISCRIMINATION 
One of the central problems faced in Dewey was the definition of 
religious discrimination under title VII. At least three such defi-
nitions are possible. First, title VII could be interpreted to pro-
hibit only intentional and willful acts of discrimination-that is, 
discrimination by intent-such as an employer's refusal to hire Jews 
or Catholics because of their religion. Second, it would be possible 
to construe title VII as prohibiting an employer action or rule that is 
otherwise neutral on its face, such as a requirement that all workers 
must work on Sunday, if the action is not uniform in its impact on 
employees holding differing religious beliefs-in other words, dis-
crimination by effect. Third, title VII could be construed as incor-
porating the more recent 1967 EEOC guidelines, which adopt the 
discrimination-by-effect standard, but which allow for exculpation 
(I) if the employer has made an effort reasonably to accommodate 
the religious needs of the employee, or (2) if an accommodation can-
not be made without undue hardship to the employer. 
In Dewey, the Sixth Circuit on rehearing unmistakably limited 
title VII's proscription to the intentional religious-discrimination 
standard. Although the court toyed with the reasonable-accommoda-
tion theory in its first opinion, only to conclude, contrary to· the 
district court, that Reynolds had made such an accommodation, 99 its 
97. Kahn, supra note Zl, at 7. 
98. 429 F.2d at 885. 
99. 429 F.2d at 881. 
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second decision rejects any such requirement.100 The district court, 
on the other hand, adopted both the EEOC standard of accommoda-
tion and, by badly straining Sherbert v. Verner, the discrimination-
by-effect standard.101 Thus, the series of opinions in Dewey brings 
into focus the conflicting definitions of discrimination and illustrates 
the scope that can be given to each. In order to resolve this conflict, 
it is useful to look at the sources from which the proper definition of 
discrimination can be gleaned. 
A. The Legislative History 
The most readily available source is, of course, the Act itself. At 
first blush, however, title VII provides little help. Section 703(a)102 
prohibits discrimination "because" of the categories there enumer-
ated. What "because" means surely is open to dispute. Was Dewey 
discharged because he refused to work Sundays or because of his re-
ligious beliefs? Or because Reynolds refused to make a reasonable 
accommodation? Or because of all three? The word "because" is 
simply too ambiguous to provide guidance. 
Considerably more helpful are sections 703(h) and 706(g). The 
former section declares that an employer is not guilty of unlawful 
discrimination under the Act if he provides for different terms and 
conditions of employment for his employees working at different 
locations, "provided that such differences are not the result of an 
intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or na-
tional origin."103 The latter section allows for remedial relief in title 
VII cases if it is found that the employer "has intentionally engaged 
in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment prac-
tice."104 Both sections seem to be directed only at discrimination by 
intent. Indeed, this conclusion seems to be buttressed by some of 
the legislative history of the Act. 
The legislative history is admittedly sparse on this point, but 
interpretative statements made by proponents of the Act give some 
clues to the meaning of discrimination under title VII. For example, 
some comments by Senator Hubert Humphrey-one of the principal 
architects of the 1964 Civil Rights Act-lend support to the more 
restrictive definition of "discrimination": 
A new subsection 703(h) has been added, providing that it is not 
100. 429 F.2d at 335. 
101. 300 F. Supp. at 713-15. 
102. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1964). 
103. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964). 
104. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1964). 
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an unlawful employment practice for an employer to maintain 
different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment either in 
different locations or pursuant to a seniority, merit, or other incen-
tive system, provided the differences are not the result of an inten-
tion to discriminate on grounds of race, religion, or national origin. 
For example, if an employer has two plants in different locations, 
and one of the plants employs substantially more Negroes than 
the other, it is not unlawful discrimination if the pay, conditions, 
or facilities are better at one plant than at the other unless it is 
shown that the employer was intending to discriminate for or 
against one of the racial groups. Thus this provision makes clear 
that it is only discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin, that is forbidden by the title. This change does 
not narrow application of the title, but merely clarifies its present 
intent and effect.10:s 
In regard to section 706(g), he added: 
Section 706(g) is amended to require a showing of intentional 
violation of the title in order to obtain relief. This is a clarifying 
change. Since the title bars only discrimination because of race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin it would seem already to 
require intent, and, thus, the proposed change does not involve any 
substantive change in the title. The express requirement of intent is 
designed to make it wholly clear that inadvertent or accidental dis-
criminations will not violate the title or result in entry of court 
orders. It means simply that the respondent must have intended to 
discriminate.106 
If by "inadvertent or accidental discriminations" Senator Humphrey 
had in mind neutral employer acts that are nondiscriminatory in ap-
plication but discriminatory in effect, then his statements do indeed 
give credence to the view that "discrimination" under title VII means 
only discrimination by intent. 
Further support for this narrow definition of discrimination can 
be found in the views expressed by Senators Joseph Clark and Clifford 
Case, the floor managers of the Civil Rights Act. In their interpreta-
tive memorandum concerning title VII, they noted, inter alia: 
It has been suggested that the concept of discrimination is 
vague. In fact it is clear and simple and has no hidden meanings. 
To discriminate is to make a distinction, to make a difference in 
treatment or favor, and those distinctions or differences in treatment 
or favor which are prohibited by section 704 are those which are 
based on any five of the forbidden criteria: race, color, religion, sex 
105. IIO CONG, REc. 12,723 (1964). 
106. IIO CoNG. REc. 12,723·24 (1964) (emphasis added). 
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and national origin. Any other criterion or qualification for employ-
ment is not affected by this title.101 
Under this narrow view, Reynolds surely did not discriminate against 
Dewey, since it applied its compulsory overtime requirement and 
replacement scheme evenhandedly. Indeed, under the Clark-Case 
standard, Reynolds, by accommodating Dewey's religious beliefs as 
it was required to do under the EEOC guidelines, would arguably be 
guilty of an unlawful employment practice under title VII, for such 
an accommodation would seemingly constitute favored treatment. 
This narrow definition of discrimination is also sustained by a 
memorandum prepared by the Justice Department in reply to Sen-
ator Lister Hill's argument that title VII would undermine seniority 
systems. This memorandum noted: 
Title VII is directed at discrimination based on race, color, reli-
gion, sex or national origin. It is perfectly clear that when a worker 
is laid off or denied a chance for promotion because under estab-
lished seniority rules he is "low man on the totem pole" he is not 
being discriminated against because of his race. Of course, if the 
seniority rule itself is discriminatory, it would be unlawful under 
Title VII. If a rule were to state that all Negroes must be laid off 
before any white man, such a rule could not serve as the basis for a 
discharge subsequent to the effective date of the title.108 
In distinguishing between a system that is based on the equal ap-
plication of a rule-for example, seniority-and one that relies on 
the prohibited categories-for example, requiring all Negroes to be 
laid off first-the Justice Department's memorandum is clearly 
premised on the narrow definition of discrimination. 
B. The Problem of Race Discrimination 
While the legislative history of title VII appears to support the 
narrow view of discrimination-and it surely does not give explicit 
support to the broader discrimination-by-effect view-the courts have 
nevertheless been reluctant to embrace the former definition, prob-
ably because of the difficult and subtle problems posed by racial, 
rather than religious, discrimination under the Act.109 Even before 
107. 110 CONG, REC, 7213 (1964). 
108. 110 CONG, REc. 7207 (1964). 
109. On March 8, 1971, as this Article was going to print, the Supreme Court 
rendered its first significant interpretation of title VII in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 
39 U.S.L.W. 4317 (U.S. March 8, 1971). In Griggs the Court was faced with a case in-
volving the present effects of past willful race discrimination against black workers. 
After the employer abandoned his policy of overt discrimination, he initiated a new 
policy that required a high-school diploma and completion of intelligence tests for all 
jobs from which blacks had previously been excluded. In holding these requirements 
to be in violation of title VII, the Court ruled: 
The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language 
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the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the federal courts at-
tempted to curb racial bigotry by finding discrimination in cases in 
which a requirement that was nondiscriminatory on its face led in 
practice to a discriminatory result. The decision of the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Meredith v. Fair110 is a good example of this ap-
proach. Meredith involved a requirement at the University of Missis-
sippi that, in order to be admitted to the university, an applicant 
was required to furnish the names of six university alumni who could 
attest to the applicant's good character. On its face such a require-
ment appears nondiscriminatory; but since there were no Negro 
graduates of the university, it was virtually impossible for a Negro 
applicant to have six alumni attest to his good character. Conse-
quently, the requirement was found to be discriminatory. 
Given the historical patterns and traditions of racism in the United 
States, and in light of the strong congressional mandate embodied in 
the Civil Rights Act to eliminate the "glaring ... discrimination 
against Negroes,"111 it is not surprising that some federal courts have 
adopted the broad definition of discrimination in title VII cases.112 
But this judicial approach may be unnecessary, a possibility that can 
be demonstrated again with reference to Meredith. While Meredith 
seems to support the broad discrimination-by-effect definition, it may 
actually be a better example of the narrow discrimination-by-intent 
view. The rule being challenged in Meredith was innocuous on its 
face, but the court recognized that the rule was deliberately estab-
lished for the purpose of discriminating against Negroes.113 Thus, it 
can be legitimately asserted that the case really involved intentional 
discrimination; it would be a good example of discrimination by 
effect only if the court had assumed that the University of Mississippi 
had established the alumni rule without intending to discriminate. 
of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove 
barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white 
employees over other employees. Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests 
neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if 
they operate to "freeze" the status quo of prior discriminatory employment prac-
tices .••• What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and 
unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to dis-
criminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification •••• The Act 
proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, 
but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an em-
ployment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be 
related to job performance, the practice is prohibited. 
39 U.S.L.W. at 4319. 
BO. 298 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1962). 
lll. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1963). 
ll2. See, e.g., United States v. IBEW, Local 38, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1970); Gregory 
v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Dewey v. Reynolds Metals 
Co., 300 F. Supp. 709 (W .D. Mich. 1969). 
llll. 298 F.2d at 701. 
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That assumption, however, would surely have been contrary to fact. 
The point of this analysis is to suggest that the courts need not 
adhere to a broad definition of discrimination in race cases under 
title VII because the desired results may be satisfactorily achieved 
under the more limited heading of discrimination by intent. In other 
words, in the race cases, a finding of an unlawful employment practice 
based on the present effects of past acts of willful discriminationm 
should be classified as discrimination by intent, not by effect;116 the 
discriminatory effects in such cases are premised, in the first instance, 
on an intent or design to treat Negroes differently from whites. Either 
definition scheme will lead to the same result in cases of racial dis-
crimination, but the adoption of a standard of discrimination by in-
tent will produce entirely different results in religious-discrimination 
cases than will a standard of discrimination by effect. 
C. The Role of the EEOC in Fashioning a Definition 
of Discrimination 
In grappling with the problem of defining religious discrimina-
tion under title VII, another source of guidance is, of course, the 
EEOC. As the Supreme Court has noted, "When faced with a prob-
lem of statutory construction, this Court shows great deference to 
the interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged 
with its administration."116 
Although the EEOC is surely a source of guidance in construing 
title VII, there are two compelling reasons here to suggest that the 
role of the Commission, in fashioning a definition of "discrimina-
tion," should be somewhat circumscribed. One of these reasons was 
suggested long ago by the Supreme Court: 
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the 
Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts 
by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and 
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort 
for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case 
will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the 
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pro-
nouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, 
if lacking power to control.111 
Thus, in a case such as Dewey, the weight of judicial deference to be 
114. See Local 189, Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. 
denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970). 
115. This point is amplified in the text accompanying notes 175-83 infra. 
116. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). Accord, Phillips v. Martin Marietta 
Corp., 39 U.S.L.W. 4160, 4161 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1971) (Justice Marshall, concurring in the 
per curiam decision); Idaho Sheet Metal Works v. Wirtz, 383 U.S. 190, 205 (1966). 
117. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (emphasis added). 
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accorded the Commission's judgment is a function of the thorough-
ness, validity, and consistency in the EEOC reasoning. In Dewey there 
were two sets of EEOC guidelines for religious discrimination that 
seriously conflicted with one another: the earlier 1966 guidelines 
that limited the proscription to intentional discrimination and 
arguably did not require accommodation in a Dewey-type situa-
tion;118 and the more recent 1967 guidelines that broadened the im-
pact of the former guidelines to require accommodation in such cir-
cumstances.119 Given this reversal of position by the EEOC, there is 
a serious question whether the EEOC's judgment lacks "consistency 
with earlier and later pronouncements."120 Moreover, as will be 
shown,121 the EEOC has been inconsistent in applying its accommoda-
tion formulation: it has treated a charge of religious discrimination 
differently when the charge is based on the application of a union 
shop provision than when based on other provisions of a collective 
bargaining contract, such as the compulsory overtime provision in 
issue in Dewey. 
The second reason suggesting that the role of the EEOC should be 
circumscribed here is the statutory scheme of enforcement under 
title VII. Under the Act, the EEOC has no enforcement power;122 
moreover, under its own interpretation of the statute, the Commis-
sion is without power to prevent a party from bringing a court action 
if the party himself rejects the settlement reached between the EEOC 
and the employer.123 The Commission's view is in accord with court 
decisions124 that have emphasized that "under Title VII, the charging 
party and suing plaintiff acts as a private attorney general"125 and 
that the primary responsibility for the adjudication of rights under 
title VII rests with the courts, not with the Commission.126 This view 
also comports with the legislative history of the Act, which indicates 
118. 31 Fed. Reg. 8370 (1966), set forth in note 43 supra. See text accompanying 
note 132 infra. 
119. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1970), set forth in note 44 supra. See text accompanying 
notes 133-39 infra. 
120. See text accompanying note 117 supra. 
121. See text accompanying notes 142-46 infra. 
122, The United States Senate recently voted to give the EEOC the power to issue 
cease-and-desist orders in order to enforce title VII. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Enforcement Act of 1970, S. 2453, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). However, the House ver-
sion of the bill stalled in the Rules Committee and did not clear the House before 
expiration of the 91st Congress. Proponents of the legislation thus will have to begin 
again and win both Senate and House passage in the new Congress. 
123. Letter from the EEOC Director of Compliance to U.S. Gypsum Co., June 19, 
1967, cited in Cox v. United States Gypsum Co., 284 F. Supp. 74, 84 (N.D. Ind. 1968), 
124. See, e.g., Flowers v. Local 6, Laborers, 431 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1970). 
125. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 715 (7th Cir. 1969). 
126. Fekete v. United States Steel Corp., 424 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1970); Culpepper 
v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970). 
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that Congress did not intend to place "the Commission in the Court 
House door."127 
Given this lack of enforcement power and the inconsistent be-
havior of the EEOC, perhaps it is not surprising to find that the 
Commission, which filed an amicus brief to the Sixth Circuit in sup-
port of Dewey's petition for a rehearing, implicitly urged the court to 
ignore its guidelines.128 Recognizing that the 1966 guidelines, not the 
more stringent 1967 guidelines relied on by the district court, were 
in effect when Dewey was discharged,129 the EEOC attempted in its 
brief to soft-pedal the significance of the district court's ex post facto 
application of the later 1967 guidelines, arguing that 
[t]he timing of the Commission interpretations is irrelevant, since as 
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated in Fekete v. U.S. 
Steel, 2 FEP Cases at p. 543: 
But in this role of investigator and conciliator, the Commission 
is not the final arbiter of an individual's grievance. 
Although the Court is to accord great weight to the Commission's 
interpretation of the statute .•• it may not deprive the plaintiff of 
relief from the unlawful employment practice by turning to a de-
funct Commission guideline.1ao 
In circumstances such as these, when the EEOC itself has argued that 
its guidelines should be ignored, the courts should show grudging, if 
any, deference to the Commission's judgment. 
Since the courts may decide that, despite the preceding arguments, 
the Commission does have a purposeful role to play in construing 
religious discrimination under the Act, it may be useful here to re-
view some of the EEOC interpretations concerning the obligations 
of an employer under title VII. The Commission's first religious 
guidelines, issued June 15, 1966,131 required an employer to make 
only very limited accommodation for his employees' religious be-
127. Cox v. United States Gypsum Co., 284 F. Supp. 74, 84 (N.D. Ind. 1968). The 
district court in United States Gypsum derived its "Court House door" phrase from a 
comment by Senator Javits that illustrated that the EEOC was not intended to be the 
only party with standing to sue under title VII: "The Commission may find the claim 
invalid; yet the complainant still can sue, and so may the Attorney General, if he 
finds reasonable cause for doing so. In short the Commission does not hold the key 
to the courtroom door." 110 CONG. REc. 13,697 (1964), quoted in 284 F. Supp. at 83. 
128. :Brief for EEOC as Amicus Curiae at 10-11, Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 
429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970). 
129. Under the Act, an employer is relieved from liability under title VII for the 
alleged commission of an unlawful employment practice if he "pleads and proves that 
the act of omission complained of was in good faith, in conformity with and in 
reliance on any written interpretation or opinion of the commission." 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-12(b)(l) (1964). 
l!lO. :Brief for EEOC as Amicus Curiae at 10-11, Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 
429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970). 
131. 31 Fed. Reg. 8370 (1966). See note 43 supra. 
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liefs, and required none at all if the result would be either serious 
inconvenience to the employer or disproportionate allocation of un-
favorable work. Moreover, the 1966 guidelines stated that an em-
ployer could prescribe a work week applicable to all employees, even 
though such a schedule did not operate with uniformity in its effect 
upon the religious beliefs of all employees. Of greatest importance in 
the Dewey situation, the guidelines provided: 
(3) The employer may prescribe the normal work week and fore-
seeable overtime requirements, and, absent an intent on the part of 
the employer to discriminate on religious grounds, a job applicant 
or employee who accepted the job knowing or having reason to 
believe that such requirements would conflict with his religious 
obligations is not entitled to demand any alterations in such require-
ments to accommodate his religious needs.132 
At the time of Dewey's conversion the compulsory overtime require-
ment was part of the collective bargaining agreement; therefore, 
under the Commission's 1966 guidelines, Reynolds was not guilty of 
discrimination. 
Under the new guidelines, effective July 10, 1967,133 the reason-
able-accommodation provision is far more stringent; an employer can 
avoid the requirement that he make reasonable accommodation only 
by carrying the burden of proving undue hardship. Employers have 
been able to meet this burden only in truly compelling cases-for 
example, when the job required availability on a seven-day-a-week, 
round-the-clock basis, 134 or when a short harvesting season necessitated 
attendance every day for six weeks.135 In more pedestrian cases-for 
example, when an Orthodox J ew136 or a member of the Radio Church 
of God137 wanted to leave work early on Friday nights, or when an 
employee was absent several Saturdays because of his religious be-
liefs138-the Commission has found that the employer had not met its 
burden of proving undue hardship. In fact, in the last case, the Com-
mission used rather sweeping language in defining discrimination. 
It ruled: "[W]hile a rule may apply equally to all employees, it may 
well have unequal impact on them .... A rule which forces a person 
to choose between his religion and his job limits that person's exer-
cise of his religion and is thereby discriminatory in its effect.''139 
lll2. 31 Fed. Reg. 8370 (1966). See note 43 supra. 
133. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1970). See note 44 supra. 
134. EEOC Dec. No. 70773, 2 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. 686 (May 7, 1970). 
135. EEOC Dec. No. 7099, 2 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. 227 (1969). 
136. EEOC Dec. No. 70716, 2 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. 684 (April 23, 1970). 
137. EEOC Dec. No. 70670, 2 FAIR ElllPL. PRAc. CAS. 586 (March 30, 1970). 
lll8. EEOC Dec. No. 70580, 2 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. 516 (March 2, 1970). 
139. 2 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. at 516. 
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D. The Impact of the EEOC Definition of Discrimination 
Before moving on, it might be useful to consider the impact and 
breadth of the Commission's rules. Assume that an employer operates 
a seven-day-a-week operation, that he has entered into a collective 
bargaining contract with a union, and that the contract provides for 
shift preference by seniority. What if a low-seniority employee, who 
works a shift that includes Saturday and Sunday, converts to a religion 
that requires him not to work on one of those days? Must the em-
ployer then transfer this employee out of a Sunday or Saturday shift 
even though numerous employees with greater seniority are required 
to work over the weekend? Under the EEOC guidelines, the transfer 
of one employee could hardly be said to create an "undue hardship" 
for the employer, but what of the other employees? What of the hard-
ship imposed on the employee who waited a long time to acquire 
sufficient seniority in order to avoid weekend work and is now forced 
back into it because of someone else's religious beliefs? Axe the 
religious beliefs of one individual so weighty that they supersede the 
lack of religious beliefs of another? Or suppose a job applicant in-
forms his prospective employer that he cannot work Sundays, a day 
that he would be expected to work because of his lack of seniority. 
Does the employer discriminate by not offering the applicant a job? 
Again, in the absence of "undue hardship"-which is nearly im-
possible to demonstrate if the work force is large enough-the em-
ployer would be guilty of discrimination unless he gave the job ap-
plicant a non-Sunday shift, something to which the applicant would 
not be entitled but for his religious beliefs. Compare this problem 
with that of an employee who wants to take a few weeks off for a 
pilgrimage or one who refuses to work Sunday overtime, as Dewey 
did. 
The thrust of this argument is that the reasonable-accommoda-
tion formulation imposes a priority of the religious over the secular. 
Freedom of religion necessarily includes the freedom not to believe, 
as well as the freedom to believe.140 Who is to say that the desire to 
stay home Sunday and do nothing is any less worthy of protection 
than is the need to attend church that same day? But the EEOC's 
standard clearly chooses the one over the other. In so doing, it mis-
conceives not only title VII but the delicate balance between the free 
exercise of religion and the operation of a secular society.141 
140. The first amendment guaranty of religious freedom has been recognized as 
extending protection to members of secular society against governmental action that 
. is invoked "because of their faith, or lack of it." Everson v. Board of Educ., lll!O U.S. 
1, 16 (1947). 
141. Cf. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
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It is curious, however, that the Commission has not applied its 
reasonable-accommodation standard uniformly to all provisions of a 
collective bargaining contract. In fact, the Commission has opined 
from the outset that an employer who, pursuant to a union shop 
provision, requires an employee to join a union contrary to the 
employee's religious beliefs does not discriminate against that em-
ployee by discharging him for refusing to join the union.142 The 
Commission's General Counsel has taken the position that, since 
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) specifically permits union 
shop agreements without providing for religious exemptions,143 a 
discharge for failure to join a union does not constitute discrimina-
tion under title VII.144 The EEOC has never satisfactorily explained, 
however, why a union shop provision should be treated differently 
from any other provision in a collective bargaining contract-for 
example, a compulsory overtime provision. Granted, the NLRA 
specifically allows a union shop agreement, but section 8(d)145 of the 
same Act has been construed to permit union and employer agree-
ments on compulsory overtime; indeed, an employer violates the 
Act if he refuses to bargain over such a clause.146 If there is a dis-
tinction between the two types of provisions, it is one without a 
difference. 
Union shop provisions have, of course, been upheld under both 
the Railway Labor Act147 and the NLRA148 as not infringing the first 
amendment rights of employees who refused to join, and were later 
discharged, because of their religious scruples. These decisions have 
recently received implied support from the Supreme Court's denial 
of certiorari in Russell v. Catherwood,149 a case in which a New York 
appellate court disallowed unemployment compensation eligibility 
142. The Commission adopted this position prior to the promulgation of any 
guidelines. See Opinion of the EEOC General Counsel, G.C. 641-65, Dec. 29, 1965, 
in BNA LAB. POLICY &: PRAc. 401:1006 (1967). The Commission's position remained un-
changed after the 1966 guidelines were formulated. See Opinion Letter of EEOC Acting 
General Counsel, Jan. 26, 1967, in BNA LAB. POLICY &: PRAc. 401:3033 (1967). 
143. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1964). 
144. Opinion Letter ·of EEOC Acting General Counsel, Jan. 26, 1967, in BNA LAB. 
POLICY &: PRAC. 401:3033 (1967). 
145. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964). 
146. See, e.g., NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); 
NLRB v. Century Cement Mfg. Co., 208 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1953). 
147. See, e.g., Gray v. Gulf, M. &: O.R.R., 429 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 
39 U.S.L.W. 3298 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1971); Wicks v. Southern Pacific Co., 231 F.2d 130 (9th 
Cir. 1956); Otten v. Baltimore &: O.R.R., 205 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1953). 
148. Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 316 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Mass. 1970). 
149. 33 App. Div. 2d 592, 304 N.Y.S.2d 415, cert. denied, 399 U.S. 936 (1970). See also 
Stimpel v. California State Personnel Bd., 6 Cal App. 3d 206, 85 Cal. Rptr. 797, cert. 
denied, 400 U.S. 952 (1970). 
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for an individual who refused to accept jobs that would require him 
to join a union.150 
In the context of its reasonable-accommodation requirement, the 
Commission would do well to consider the remarks of Judge Learned 
Hand in a union shop case, Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad.151 
In rejecting a first amendment attack on the constitutionality of a 
union shop provision under the Railway Labor Act, he said: 
The First Amendment protects one against action by the govern-
ment, though even then, not in all circumstances; but it gives no one 
the right to insist that in the pursuit of their own interests others 
must conform their conduct to his own religious necessities. A man 
might find it incompatible with his conscience to live in a city in 
which open saloons were licensed; yet he would have no constitu-
tional right to insist that the saloons must be closed. He would have 
to leave the city or put up with the iniquitous dens, no matter what 
economic loss his change of domicil entailed. We must accommodate 
our idiosyncrasies, religious as well as secular, to the compromises 
necessary in communal life; and we can hope for no reward for the 
sacrifices this may require beyond our satisfaction from within, or 
our expectations of a better world.152 
In sum, the current EEOC guidelines are contradictory, both in 
terms of present application and in light of the prior guidelines; 
furthermore, they appear to be premised on a fundamentally dis-
torted conception of the proper place of religion in a secular society. 
E. Legal Precedent and Constitutional Considerations 
A more helpful aid in fashioning a definition of discrimination 
may be the judicial precedents that have been formulated under the 
first amendment, under title VII, and under state FEP laws. Of 
central import in this connection is Sherbert v. Verner.153 The Sixth 
Circuit, in its review of Dewey, was not terribly helpful in its treat-
ment of the applicability of Sherbert since it dismissed the case with 
the comment that it "involved state, and not private action."15i The 
comment is correct, but it sheds no light on the parameters set forth 
150. Justice Douglas and Chief Justice Burger dissented to the denial of certiorari 
on the grounds that the case raised serious first amendment difficulties. 399 U.S. at 936. 
151. 205 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1953). 
152. 205 F.2d at 61. In Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 316 F. Supp. 1369, 1373 (D. 
Mass. 1970), the district court noted that 
[a] purely private employer has a common law freedom to dismiss at will an em-
ployee who has no contrary contract .••• While that freedom has been curbed 
by statutes such as the NLR Act and the Civil Rights Act of July 2, 1964 ••• no 
federal statute • • • precludes [an employer) from acting pursuant to a union 
shop contract (which has no avowed or covert purpose to discriminate on reli-
gious, racial, or like prohibited ground) to dismiss an employee for nonpayment of 
union dues. Nor does the First Amendment apply to a wholly private employer's 
act to terminate, pursuant to the common law, employment of one of his workers, 
153. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
154. 429 F.2d at 329. 
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in Sherbert of permissible state interference with religious beliefs, 
or on how the rationale may affect the somewhat parallel problem in 
Dewey under title VII. 
Sherbert involved South Carolina's refusal, on the ground that 
she was unavailable for work, to give unemployment compensation 
benefits to a Seventh Day Adventist who declined to work on Satur-
day. While the Supreme Court often used rather broad language in 
its opinion striking down this phase of South Carolina's scheme of 
unemployment compensation, it clearly held that if a legislative 
scheme could be justified by a compelling state interest within the 
state's police power, then any incidental burden on the free exercise 
of religion would not render the scheme unconstitutional. The 
Court, however, found no such compelling state interest present in 
Sherbert. It distinguished the cases involving Sunday closing laws, 
which impose an additional burden on Orthodox Jews and Seventh 
Day Adventists, on the grounds that there was a compelling state 
interest in those cases. The Court held: 
In these respects, then, the state interest asserted in the present 
case is wholly dissimilar to the interests which were found to justify 
the less direct burden upon religious practices in Braunfeld v. 
Brown, supra. The Court recognized that the Sunday closing law 
which that decision sustained undoubtedly served "to make the 
practice of [the Orthodox Jewish merchants] ... religious beliefs 
more expensive." 366 U.S. at 605, 81 S. Ct., at 1147. But the statute 
was nevertheless saved by a countervailing factor which finds no 
equivalent in the instant case-a strong state interest in providing 
one uniform day of rest fot all workers. That secular objective could 
be achieved, the Court found, only by declaring Sunday to be that 
day of rest. Requiring exemptions for Sabbatarians, while theo-
retically possible, appeared to present an administrative problem of 
such magnitude, or to afford the exempted class so great a com-
petitive advantage that such a requirement would have rendered the 
entire statutory scheme unworkable. In the present case no such 
justifications underlie the determination of the state court that 
appellant's religion makes her ineligible to receive benefits.ms 
Sherbert, of course, can be read as lending support to the EEOC's 
guidelines if "compelling state interest" can be equated with "undue 
hardship." For several reasons, however, such an argument is open to 
criticism. First, the equation simply does not balance. The relation-
ship of government and the individual under the first amendment is 
wholly different than the employment relationship, especially when 
a collective bargaining agreement operates alongside title VII. The 
first amendment has long been the bulwark of individual rights, and 
155. 374 U.S. at 408-09. 
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the Court has viewed group values to be less compelling than those 
asserted by individuals. Thus, if a crowd dislikes what a speaker is 
saying, it is the responsibility of the police not to quiet the speaker, 
but to calm the crowd.156 Similarly, what is viewed as obscene by a 
jury has frequently been held to be constitutionally protected.157 
On the other hand, in the context of collective bargaining under 
our national labor policy as embodied in the NLRA, the Court has 
emphasized the subjugation of the interests of the individual to those 
of the group-the union.158 Thus, in the absence of hostility or un-
fair representation, a union can deprive an individual of his seniority 
rights159 or settle a grievance adversely to an individual employee,160 
even though the individual objects. In the collective bargaining set· 
ting, it makes little sense to require a compelling interest to uphold 
an evenhandedly applied contractual provision against a claim of 
uneven impact on an employee's religious beliefs since such a rule 
would obviously impair the effectiveness of the recognized statutory 
bargaining representative.161 
Indeed, in the context of a collective bargaining contract, even-
handed administration may well serve as the sort of compelling in-
terest required by Sherbert. This rationale has served as the basis 
of the awards of arbitrators who have been confronted with indi-
vidual employee claims of religious discrimination resulting from the 
uneven impact of contractual provisions. As one arbitrator has said: 
This Arbitrator is most sympathetic with anyone in these days 
who adheres sincerely and devoutly to the tenets of a truly religious 
belief. But he is also fully mindful of the chaos which would follow 
the application of the principle that any employee can determine 
for himself, for reasons sufficient to him, whether he will regularly 
not work on a work day which management has the right to sched-
ule. The Arbitrator therefore can find no adequate basis for finding 
that the contract-granted right of the Company to require Saturday 
work from X-was not reasonable.162 
156. See City of Chicago v. Gregory, 394 U.S. Ill (1969). 
157. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 187-90 (1964), and cases cited therein. 
158. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Ford 
Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953). See also Edwards, Due Process Considerations 
in Labor Arbitration, 25 ARB. J. (n.s.) 141 (1970). 
159. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 
330 (1953). 
160. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). 
161. The need for uniformity in the application of the law of labor relations was 
emphasized by the Supreme Court in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 
(1957), in which the Court declared that, under § 301 of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964), law is to be uniform throughout the country in 
both the federal and state systems. 
162, Combustion Engineering, Inc., 49 Lab. Arb. 204, 206 (1967). 
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Another arbitrator has noted: 
What Shaw is asking for is a unique kind of treatment applicable to 
him and not to others who may have different, but equally valid, 
reasons for avoiding their work schedules. To adopt a special rule 
excepting Shaw from working his work schedule would be unfair 
to all other employees, and discriminatory against them. Shaw him-
self must realize that if a new rule was made to accommodate each 
and every religious conviction, the plant's work schedules would 
soon be reduced to a haphazard and chaotic state.163 
In Andrews v. O'Grady,164 this same theme emerges. There, a 
New York City bus driver, who was a Seventh Day Adventist, charged 
that his first amendment rights were violated when the New York 
Transit System fired him for his refusal to work on Saturday. In 
upholding his discharge, the New York court noted: 
There can be no doubt, from long experience, that the seniority 
rules to which petitioner has refused to conform are the only fair 
way to assure that every man is treated on a nondiscriminatory basis 
with respect to work assignments. These time-honored rules are, 
therefore, most essential to the efficient and safe operation of the city 
transportation system.165 
Many of these same considerations also underlie the refusal of courts 
and the National Labor Relations Board to overturn union shop 
provisions on religious grounds166 and their rejection of religious 
belief as a defense to an unfair labor practice charge under the 
NLRA.101 
Sherbert, then, is inapposite, not only because the relationship of 
government to the individual in the first amendment setting is 
different than the relationship between the individual and the 
group in the collective bargaining context; but also because the 
evenhanded application of a collective bargaining contract is of 
crucial significance. This latter viewpoint has been adopted by 
numerous labor arbitrators, and, as the Supreme Court has often 
indicated, their judgment should not be ignored.168 Finally, it should 
be noted that the Court in Sherbert, in its discussion of the Sunday-
16!1. John Morrell & Co., 17 Lab. Arb. 280, 282 (1951). See also Singer Co., 48 Lab. 
Arb. 1!14!1 (1967). 
164. 44 Misc. 2d 28, 252 N.Y.S.2d 814 (Sup. Ct. 1964). 
165. 44 Misc. 2d at !l!I, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 819. 
166. See notes 152-5!1 supra and accompanying text. 
167. See, e.g., A.C. Rochat Co., 16!1 N.L.R.B. 421 (1967). 
168. Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Steelworkers v. Warrior 
& Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 
36!1 U.S. 593 (1960), 
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closing-law case, indicated that once a compelling state interest was 
shown, the state was not required to make an accommodation to any 
member of the affected class.169 Similarly, in the context of alleged 
religious discrimination under title VII, given the need for uniform 
application of contractual provisions, no finding of discrimination 
should be made nor accommodation required unless it is shown that 
the contract clause in question was intentionally designed to achieve 
the prohibited discrimination. Otherwise, the "accommodation" 
itself will establish a pattern of discrimination that favors and 
exempts certain religious believers from their obligations to per-
form under admittedly lawful contract provisions.17° 
Another line of cases that deserves mention in grappling with the 
definition of discrimination involves alleged racial discrimination in 
the application of hiring practices and seniority systems.171 Read 
broadly, these cases arguably establish "effect" as the key to the work-
ing definition of discrimination. A closer examination of these 
cases, however, reveals that, while the seniority system or referral 
system in question might currently be racially neutral, its present 
discriminatory effect, despite evenhanded administration, is the 
product of past racial discrimination in the most blatant subjective 
form. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has 
recently recognized this problem in United States v. International 
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 38,172 in which it held: 
When the stated purposes of the Act and the broad affirmative 
relief authorization above are read in context with § 2000e-2G), we 
believe that section cannot be construed as a ban on affirmative relief 
against continuation of effects of past discrimination resulting from 
present practices (neutral on their face) which have the practical 
effect of continuing past injustices. 
Any other interpretation would allow complete nullification of 
the stated purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This could 
result from adoption of devices such as a limitation of new appren-
tices to relatives of the all-white membership of a union, Int'l Ass'n 
of Heat&: Frost Insulators&: Asbestos Wkrs., Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 
F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969), or limitation of membership to persons 
who had previous work experience under union contract, while 
such experience was racially limited to whites, United Papermakers 
169. 374 U.S. at 408-09. 
170. Cf. Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 316 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Mass. 1970). See generally 
P. KURLAND, OF CHURCH AND STATE AND THE SUPREME COURT 26 (1961). 
171. See, e.g., United States v. IBEW, Local 38, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1970); Local 
189 Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 
(1970). See also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970), revd., 39 
U.SL.W. 4317 (U.S. March 8, 1971). See note 109 supra. 
172. 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1970). 
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& Paperworkers, Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 
1969) •••• 173 
The finding of discrimination in these cases, therefore, is premised 
on the fact that at one time discrimination by design was present 
and that such discrimination is carried forward to the present by 
practices that appear racially neutral.174 
Given this special situation in the racial-discrimination cases, it 
is not at all anomalous that the Sixth Circuit seems to define discrimi-
nation more narrowly in Dewey than in International Brotherhood 
of Electrical Workers, Local 38. Actually, it can be argued that the 
court adheres to the view of discrimination by intent in both cases, 
but that in International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 
38 the court recognizes that discrimination by intent, once com-
mitted, cannot be corrected by the mere declaration of a defendant-
employer or union-that it will mend its ways in the future. Rather, 
the court finds that willful discrimination previously practiced must 
be destroyed "root and branch,"175 and applies this standard to 
"sophisticated as well as simple minded modes of discrimination."176 
In addition to the legal precedent discussed above, there are 
numerous cases arising under state FEP laws that also lend support 
to the narrow definition of discrimination.177 A good recent example 
is In re Eastern Greyhound Lines Division of Greyhound Lines, 
Incorporated v. New York State Division of Human Rights.178 In 
that case, a bearded Orthodox Muslim was not hired for a job as a 
baggage handler because the employer had a rule against its em-
ployees wearing beards. The job applicant claimed discrimination, 
arguing that wearing a beard was decreed by his religion. Rejecting 
his claim, the New York Court of Appeals declared that religious 
173. 428 F.2d at 149-50. 
174. See, e.g., Griggs v- Duke Power Co., 39 U.S.L.W. 4317 (U.S. March 8, 1971). 
175. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968). 
176. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 342 (1960). 
177. See, e.g., Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. California FEPC, 7 RACE REL. 
L. REP. 164 (Los Angeles Super. Ct. 1962); IBEW, Local 35 v. Commn. on Civil Rights, 
140 Conn. 537, 102 A.2d 366 (1953); Strong v. Massachusetts Commn. Against Discrimina-
tion, 351 Mass. 554, 222 N.E.2d 885 (1967); Andrews v. O'Grady, 44 Misc. 2d 28, 252 
N.Y.S.2d 814 (Sup. Ct. 1964); In re Council v_ Donovan, 40 Misc. 2d 744,750,244 N.Y.S.2d 
199,205 (Sup. Ct. 1963). Several commentators have also taken the narrower interpretation. 
One commentator has stated: "In order to prove that an employer has unlawfully dis-
criminated against either a job applicant or an employee, it must be shown that he 
relied on one of the forbidden criteria in making a personnel selection." Mittenthal, 
The Michigan Fair Employment Practices Act, 35 MICH. ST. B.J. No. 5, at 47 (1956) 
(emphasis added). See also Note, An American Legal Dilemma-Proof of Discrimination, 
17 U. CHI. L. REv. 107, 110 (1949). 
178. 27 N.Y.2d 279, 265 N.E.2d 745, 317 N.Y.S.2d 322, afjg. 34 App. Div. 2d 916, 311 
N.Y.S.2d 465 (1970). 
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discrimination could not be equated with an employer's failure to 
accommodate since the two are entirely different concepts; and that, 
therefore, the employer was not required to make an exception to its 
established personnel policies in order to accommodate the religious 
practices of a potential employee. It concluded: 
Policy resting on a desire to promote business by greater public 
support could justify the exclusion by an employer of beards and 
have no possible religious connotation. Such a rule, so motivated, 
as it affected employment, would not come within the bar of the 
statute unless it be shown, that which is not shown here: the employ-
ment decision was in fact actuated by discrimination against creed.179 
This decision seems correct, at least with respect to its disposition of 
the charge of religious discrimination. No evidence indicated that 
the employer did not like Orthodox Muslims; rather, its standing 
rule against employees' wearing beards cut across racial and religious 
grounds. 
In sum, the legislative history of title VII, arbitration rulings, 
and court decisions would appear to support the narrow definition 
of discrimination-that is, that only intentional discrimination is 
proscribed. In taking this position, however, due recognition should 
be accorded the compelling concern of the draftsmen of title VII 
with racial discrimination. As has been noted,180 the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 was drafted with an eye toward eliminating some of the 
severe patterns of race discrimination in the United States. In order 
to effect this primary goal, it could be argued that the courts should 
be inventive in their application of the proscriptions against race 
discrimination. Judicial inventiveness in this area, albeit sometimes 
analytically troublesome, may surely be defended on policy grounds. 
However, as pointed out above, it is unnecessary for the courts to 
move beyond the proscription of intentional discrimination in 
order to give full effect to the strong statutory policy against race 
discrimination in employment.181 
179. 27 N.Y.2d at 282, 265 N.E.2d at 746-47, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 325. 
180. See notes 5-7 supra and accompanying text. 
181. Compare discussion in pt. m. B. supra with the decision in Gregory v. Litton 
Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970). In race discrimination cases, the EEOC 
has consistently argued that if a rule, othenvise neutral on its face, has a dispropor-
tionate impact on a protected group (e.g., Negroes), then the rule should be found 
unlawful under title VII. Gregory, in effect, adopts this broad definition of intent 
under title VII. See also FEP Dec. No. 71332, 2 FAIR EMPL. PRAc. CAs. 1016 (1970), in 
which it was held that there was reasonable cause to believe that an employer violated 
title VII by its refusal to hire an unwed Negro woman. (In the county where the em-
ployer did business, 80% of the reported illegitimate babies were born to nonwhites 
and 29% of the population was Negro.) 
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Even if the proper definition of discrimination for the other 
categories of title VII-sex, race, and national origin-is arguably 
a broad one,182 the definition of "religious discrimination," especially 
when coupled with the broad definition of "religion,'' should be 
narrow. This distinction is justified because the social impact of 
religious discrimination is far less grave, as the legislative history of 
title VII surely indicates,183 than is the impact of racial discrimina-
tion. Moreover, and most significant in this respect, the individual 
has free choice in the pursuit of religion, but is unalterably born of 
a certain race, sex, and ancestry. 
IV. THE MEANING OF INTENT 
Even if the hurdle of the definition of discrimination has been 
cleared, our inquiry is not ended. For if putting a fixed meaning on 
discrimination is difficult, defining "intent" is no less so. 
The conclusion reached above, that discrimination by intent and 
not discrimination by effect should be the proper test under title VII, 
leaves open the meaning of "intent." In its strictest sense, discrimina-
tion by intent is a willful act consciously performed for the specific 
purpose and design of achieving the forbidden result.184 At the other 
extreme, "intent" may be defined with reference to the "natural and 
foreseeable consequences" test.185 Since it is not easy to search the 
human soul and ascertain individual motivation, the courts, espe-
cially in the labor field, have long ruled that a person will be held to 
intend the natural and foreseeable consequences of his acts.186 Indeed, 
this rationale has seemingly been applied in some of the court 
This definition of discrimination is at best uniquely applicable in race and sex 
cases, in which the group is easily identifiable. However, in a case involving alleged 
religious discrimination, this definition breaks down because religion, unlike race and 
sex, is not self-defining. Race is normally defined with reference to black (Negro), 
white (Caucasian), yellow (Oriental), and red (Indian) population groups in the United 
States, and sex means the male or female groups; however, religion, as shown in pt. 
II. supra, is virtually without meaningful definition, especially if nonbelievers fall 
within the scope of religion. The EEOC rule with respect to "disproportionate im-
pact" (see text accompanying note 139 supra) could arguably have some application in 
a religion case, if, for example, the facts were similar to those above and 80% of the 
reported illegitimate babies were born to Catholics and 29% of the sample community 
were also Catholic. The possibility of such a fact situation occurring is slight, however. 
182. Compare Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970) with 
United States v. !BEW, Local 38,428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1970). 
18!1. See notes 5, 7, &: IO supra. 
184. Local 189, Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 995-97 (5th Cir. 1969), 
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970). 
185. Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 675 (1961); NLRB v. Darling&: Co., 
420 F.2d 6!1, 66 (7th Cir. 1970). 
186. See, e.g., Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 45 (1954). 
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decisions that have grappled with the meaning of intent under title 
VII.187 This standard, however, is a fairly elastic one, and it could be 
used effectively to enlarge the definition of discrimination well 
beyond its narrow parameters. For example, the natural and prob-
able consequence of a rule that requires employees to work Sundays 
is to force those who have religious scruples against Sunday work 
either to be fired or to give up their religious convictions. By ap. 
plying the natural-and-foreseeable-consequences test, it could thus 
be said that such a rule has its origins in an intent to discriminate 
against one's religious beliefs. In such an instance, the requirement 
that discrimination be intentional would be essentially meaningless, 
because the meaning of intent would be all-inclusive. 
It has been suggested in some title VII cases that this latter 
definition of intent may be properly limited by the test of business 
necessity-that is, a neutral policy that foreseeably results in disparate 
treatment may nevertheless be valid if it is necessary for the safe and 
efficient operations of the business.188 In the context of religious 
discrimination under title VII, and more particularly in light of 
Dewey, four observations can be made about the validity of such a 
business necessity test. 
First, as courts and arbitrators have recognized,189 the uniform 
application of company rules or contractual provisions, such as 
seniority, may well be necessary for the safe and efficient operation 
of a business. Second, as with the expanded definition of discrimina-
tion noted earlier,190 the business necessity test has been developed 
to justify practices that, while neutral on their face, perpetuate past 
187. See, e.g., Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 250 (10th Cir. 
1970); Local 189, Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 997 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. 
denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401, 403 (C.D. 
Cal. 1970); Dobbins v. !BEW, Local 212, 292 F. Supp. 413, 448 (S.D. Ohio 1968). But 
cf. Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338 (D. Ore. 1969). 
188. See, e.g., Local 189, Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), 
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970). The court defined the business necessity test as fol-
lows: "When an employer adopts a system that necessarily carries forward the incidents 
of discrimination into the present, his practice constitutes on-going discrimination, un-
less the incidents are limited to those that safety and efficiency require." 416 F.2d at 
994. Under this test the court held: 
Our main conclusions may be summarized as follows: (I) Crown's job seniority 
system carries forward the discriminatory effects integral to the company's former 
employment practices. (2) The safe and efficient operation of the Bogalusa mill 
does not depend upon maintenance of the job seniority system. (3) To the extent 
that Crown's and the white union insisted upon carrying forward exclusion of a 
racially-determined class, without business necessity, they committed, with the re-
quisite intent, in the statutory sense, an unfair employment practice as defined 
by Title VII. 
416 F.2d at 997. This view was recently adopted by the Supreme Court in the racial-
discrimination context in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 39 U.SL.W. 4317, 4319 (U.S. March 
8, 1971). 
189. See text accompanying notes 162-67 supra. 
190. See pts. m. B. 8c III. E. supra. 
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discrimination.191 It is not difficult to understand why courts view 
with some skepticism practices that were premised in the first instance 
on willful discrimination in the plainest sense; and, as a consequence, 
why courts would require some stringent test of business necessity to 
demonstrate that such practices are now free from racial taint. If it 
could be demonstrated that a current company practice perpetuates 
past acts of willful religious discrimination, then the business 
necessity test would surely be appropriate in the religious- as well as 
the racial-discrimination cases under title VII; but, in the absence of 
such past discrimination, it surely is too stringent. 
This conclusion is supported by a third observation about the 
business necessity test. By its very nature, a collective bargaining 
contract represents a long series of compromises. To be sure, there are 
issues that result in complete victory for one side and complete 
capitulation for the other; but on the whole, the process of collective 
bargaining is one of give and take between company and union. 
Moreover, on the union side at least, the demands put forth and 
settlements made also represent compromises among political fac-
tions within the bargaining unit itself-between the young and the 
old, the skilled and the unskilled, those who work nights and those 
who work days. In such a setting, the test of business necessity might 
be an impossible one to administer. Given this vital role of compro-
mise, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court has allowed unions 
a "wide range of reasonableness," both at the negotiating table and 
in the administration of a grievance procedure.192 
For example, assume that some seniority system is necessary for 
the safe and efficient operation of a business; but there are innumer-
able possible kinds of seniority systems-job, department, and plant, 
to name but three. The particular seniority system in any one plant 
may well be a reflection of the political ebb and flow within a union 
over long periods of time, an indication of the ability of th~t particu-
lar union to impose its demands on the employer, or the result of 
the priority given such a demand by the union. Suppose that one 
particular system of seniority means that a Seventh Day Adventist or 
an Orthodox Jew would have to work on Saturdays, while another 
system would not require Saturday work. Since the first such seniority 
system could not pass a business necessity test, would that mean that 
it would have to be discarded for the second? To compound the 
191. This problem is exhaustively analyzed in the opinion by Judge Wisdom in 
Local 189, Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 
U.S. 919 (1970). 
192. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 188-95 (1967); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 
!1!10, !1!18 (195!1). 
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problem, suppose that the first seniority system adversely affects 
Seventh Day Adventists and Orthodox Jews, while the second (re-
quiring Sunday but not Saturday work) affects employees like Dewey 
who belong to the Faith Reformed Church. Must the company dis-
card both seniority systems? Or should the legality of either seniority 
system depend on a comparison of the number of Orthodox Jews 
and Faith Reformed Church members working at the plant at the 
time the system was adopted? Of course, examples such as these can 
be cited ad infinitum, because the definition of discrimination is a 
functional variant of the definition of religion and, as has been 
shown,193 there is no meaningful definitional limit to the scope of 
"religion." Thus, under the business necessity test, any seniority 
system could be found to be discriminatory, depending only upon 
the religious beliefs of the employee population at any given time. 
Finally, in the context of religious discrimination, the business 
necessity test appears to be a poorly veiled duplicate of the EEOC re-
quirement of reasonable accommodation; this latter test, with its 
grant of exculpation for "undue hardship," is surely not the law 
under title VI!.194 
Since the rejection of the business necessity test still leaves no 
viable definition of intent, it may be useful to examine constitutional-
law considerations. In cases arising under the equal protection 
clause of the fourteenth amendment, the rule has long been estab-
lished that, as long as a statute is based on rational and legitimate 
considerations, even though its impact is uneven, it is constitu-
tional.195 The Supreme Court, in Dandridge v. Williams,196 recently 
gave renewed support to this reasonable-basis test in the area of 
social and economic regulation. In that case, the Court reviewed a 
Maryland statute that limited welfare aid to eligible families depend-
ing on the number of children in the family. Although the statute 
had an uneven impact on larger families, the Court ruled that 
it was constitutional because it had a rational basis: 
In the area of economics and social welfare, a state does not violate 
the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made 
193. See pt. II. supra. 
194. See pt. III. D. supra. 
195. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Railway Express Agency 
v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Metropolis 
Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61 (1913); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas 
Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). The rational-basis test must be distinguished from the com• 
pelling-state-interest test that was followed by the Supreme Court in Sherbert. See text 
accompanying notes 153-61 supra. As noted above (see text accompanying notes 155-56 
supra), the compelling-state-interest test is the apparent forerunner of the EEOC 
undue-hardship test, and therefore is subject to serious criticism in the context of the 
enforcement of the religious-discrimination proscription under title VII. 
196. 39'7 U.S. 4'11 (19'70). 
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by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some "reasonable 
basis," it does not offend the Constitution simply because the clas-
sification "is not made with mathematical nicety or because it results 
in some inequality:•101 
It is enough that the State's action be rationally based and free from 
invidious discrimination.198 
Excluding the title VII cases involving acts of willful discrimina-
tion199 and those cases concerned with the present effects of prior acts 
of willful discrimination200-in which a business necessity test may 
be more appropriate-the constitutional test of "reasonableness" is a 
salutary one for the purpose of defining intent under the statute. 
Hence, a neutral rule that may have an unequal impact on certain 
employees because of their religious beliefs should, if supported by 
legitimate and reasonable considerations, overcome a charge of dis-
crimination by intent. 
Thus, in a Dewey-type case, if the employer can demonstrate that 
the act complained of was taken pursuant to a neutral contract provi-
sion that has a rational basis, then there should be a presumption of 
innocence and the burden of proof should be on the plaintiff to 
overcome the presumption with more specific evidence of the pro-
scribed intent. In the context of Dewey, since the employer's rule 
requiring Sunday overtime and its evenhanded administration of this 
requirement were both based on legitimate and rational considera-
tions, it is easy to see how they pass muster under title VII. On the 
other hand, rules that limit the weight a woman is allowed to 
lift201 irrespective of a particular woman's ability, and rules that limit 
a Negro's opportunity for work202 or advancement203 must surely fall. 
V. ELECTION OF REMEDIES UNDER TITLE VII: THE EMERGING 
CONFLICT BETWEEN JUDICIAL AND ARBITRATION FORUMS IN 
EMPLOYM:ENT DISCRIMINATION CASES 
The interaction between public- and private-dispute settlement 
devices is nothing new in the field of labor law. 204 In light of this past 
197. 397 U.S. at 485, quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 
(1911). 
198. 397 U.S. at 487. 
199. For example, an employer adopts a plant rule that explicitly excludes all 
Catholics from certain high-pa}ing jobs within the plant. 
200. For example, a· departmental seniority system is continued in operation in a 
plant that formerly and for many years imposed racially segregated seniority lines, freez-
ing black workers into the less desirable jobs in certain departments. This was the type 
of situation in which the Supreme Court applied the business necessity test in Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 39 U.S.L.W. 4317 (U.S. March 8, 1971). 
201. See, e.g., Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969). 
202. United States v. H.K. Porter Co., 296 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Ala. 1968). 
203. Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968). 
204. See Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964); Spielberg Mfg. 
Co., 112 NL.R.B. 1080 (1955). 
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experience, the diversity of opinion in Dewey on the question of 
election of remedies between title VII and arbitration is somewhat 
surprising. However, the split between the court of appeals and the 
district court in Dewey is in reality but a reflection of the conflicting 
opinions among many courts that have recently grappled with this 
issue.205 
At the outset, it is important to emphasize what the disagreement 
does not concern. It appears to be settled that there is no strict ab 
initio election-of-remedies requirement forcing an employee to make 
an irrevocable choice at the outset between pursuing his remedies 
under a collective bargaining contract grievance and arbitration 
procedure and pursuing his title VII remedies. The district court in 
Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Company206 is the only court to date that 
has put a plaintiff to such an ab initio choice. Thus, the plaintiff 
there was deemed to have waived his right to arbitration on the con-
tract by electing to bring a title VII action in federal court.207 The 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, however, reversed the district 
court on this issue, holding that 
[i]t was error not to permit the plaintiffs to utilize dual or parallel 
prosecution both in court and through arbitration so long as election 
of remedy was made after adjudication so as to preclude duplicate 
relief which would result in an unjust enrichment or windfall to the 
plaintiffs.208 
Even in those jurisdictions that take the position that a binding 
election of remedies may occur after a grievance has been finally 
adjudicated in arbitration or settled at an intermediate stage, the 
courts do not require the charging party initially to make a binding 
choice-as between arbitration or title VII-that will preclude a 
subsequent decision to pursue the alternative course.200 
The most compelling argument against the ab initio election 
rule is that, in general, the employee makes no informed choice. It 
is natural for an employee, especially a union member, to lodge 
quickly a grievance when he feels he has become the victim of his 
205. See, e.g., Hutchings v. United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970); 
Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Corey v. Avco Corp., 2 
FAIR EMPL. PRAc. CAS. 738 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 28, 1970). See also Dewey v. Reynolds 
Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970); Newman v. Avco Corp., 313 F. Supp. 1069 
(M.D. Tenn. 1970); Washington v. Aerojet Gen. Corp., 282 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 
1968); Edwards v. North American Rockwell Corp., 291 F. Supp. 199 (C.D. Cal. 1968). 
206. 272 F. Supp. 332, 339 (S.D. Ind. 1967). 
207. 272 F. Supp. at 339-40. 
208. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 715 (7th Cir. 1969). 
209. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970); Newman v. Avco 
Corp., 313 F. Supp. 1069 (M.D. Tenn. 1970); Washington v. Aerojet Gen. Corp., 282 
F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1968); Edwards v. North American Rockwell Corp, 291 F. Supp. 
199 (C.D. Cal. 1968). 
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employer's discrimination. The grievance procedure is usually 
initiated and often carried through several steps without the grievant 
having the advice of counsel. The aggrieved employee may not even 
be aware that he could proceed by filing a charge with the EEOC or 
state FEP commission; when he becomes aware of that alternative, it 
would certainly be an unfair surprise for the employee to learn that 
he has already lost the opportunity by promptly filing a grievance. 
This unfairness is especially manifest if the grievance procedure con-
tains strict and prompt time limitations, so that an employee will, as 
a matter of course, seek first to preserve his rights under the agree-
ment. Thus, many courts have, with sound justification, refused to 
put the employee to an immediate choice of remedies.210 
The real conflict arises, however, over whether a court should 
deem a plaintiff to have made an election of remedies precluding 
maintenance of a title VII action when he has pursued his contractual 
remedies to a final determination. The Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Dewey, acting in accord with several lower federal and state 
courts, 211 has taken the position that once an employee has pursued 
his claim to arbitration, he has made a final and binding election of 
remedies.212 On the other side, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit, in Hutchings v. United States Industries, Incorporated,213 
and the Seventh Circuit, in Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Company,214 
have held that an arbitration award or settlement at an intermediate 
stage of the grievance procedure does not operate as a bar to a title 
VII suit. 
In general, the decisions of the Fifth and Seventh Circuits mani-
fest these courts' distrust of the ability of a private process "essentially 
tailored to the needs of the contracting parties" to vindicate the 
public policies embodied in title VII.215 These courts rely on the 
premise that "determination under a contract grievance-arbitration 
process will involve rights and remedies separate and distinct from 
those involved in judicial proceedings under title VII."216 Although 
there is concurrent jurisdiction in the court and the arbitration pro-
cess, it is directly analogous to the concurrent jurisdiction of the arbi-
trator and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board); 
210. See cases cited in note 209 supra. 
211. Newman v. Avco Corp., 313 F. Supp. 1069 (M:.D. Tenn. 1970); Edwards v. 
North American Rockwell Corp., 291 F. Supp. 199 (C.D. Cal. 1968); Washington v. 
Aerojet Gen. Corp., 282 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1968); Corey v. Avco Corp., 2 FAIR EMPL. 
PRAc. CAS. 738 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 28, 1970). 
212. 429 F.2d at 332. 
213. 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970). 
214. 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969). 
215. 428 F.2d at 311-12; 416 F.2d at 175. 
216. Hutchings v. United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303, 311 (5th Cir. 1970). 
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since the NLRB is not bound under a doctrine of election of reme-
dies or res judicata to accept an arbitral determination affecting rights 
and duties under the NLRA,217 neither should the court accept an 
arbitrator's decision on title VII rights as conclusive. On the con-
trary, the Fifth and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals argue that 
there are persuasive reasons why courts should treat the arbitrator's 
decision as less than binding.218 
As has been observed,219 the enforcement of title VII has not 
been charged to an administrative agency that is comparable to the 
NLRB, which has broad powers to enforce the NLRA. The EEOC 
has no enforcement power; its power is limited to the investigation 
and conciliation of unlawful employment practice charges of employ-
ees claiming discrimination. I£ the EEOC finds reasonable cause to be-
lieve that the employee's charges are true, it attempts to alleviate the 
discriminatory practice through the informal measures of conference, 
conciliation, and persuasion.22° Failing in this role, the EEOC grants 
the aggrieved employee permission to sue, or, in appropriate cases, 
the Attorney General initiates suit.221 The Fifth and Seventh Circuits 
appear to be operating on the assumption that Congress failed to 
grant enforcement powers to the EEOC and instead reposed them in 
the courts because it felt that such an important and explosive area 
of public policy was best implemented by the expertise of the federal 
judiciary. Somehow these courts feel that to delegate to the arbitra-
tion process the power to make final and binding determinations of 
title VII rights would be to derogate from their own responsibility. 
Specifically, one hazard the courts see is that some arbitrators 
limit themselves exclusively to contractual considerations and, as a 
result, accord title VII and constitutional claims insufficient atten-
tion.222 Although it is far from a unanimous view, many arbitrators 
see themselves as creatures of the contract, whose sole function is to 
interpret and to apply the provisions of the collective bargaining 
agreement rather than to act as agents of government with the 
authority and power to effect public policy.223 For these arbitrators, 
the contract is the source and limit of their authority; to have 
recourse to an external standard in order to restrict or to nullify con-
tract terms would be to exceed the boundaries of that authority. 
217. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964). 
218. 428 F.2d at 313-14; 416 F.2d at 175. 
219. See notes 122-27 supra and accompanying text. 
220. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1964). 
221. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1964). 
222. See, e.g., Pitman-Moore Div., 49 Lab. Arb. 709 (1967). 
223. Compare United Airlines, Inc., 48 Lab. Arb. 727 (1967) with Simoniz Co., 70-1 
CCH LAB. ARB. AWARDS 1J 8024 (1969). 
March 1971] Religious Discrimination 645 
If there is an irreconcilable conflict between title VII and the 
terms of an agreement, the possible treatment outlined above justly 
warrants the fears of the courts. Professor Bernard Meltzer believes 
that, in the case of such conflict, it is the arbitrator's duty to abide by 
the contract and ignore the law.224 His view, of course, serves to 
highlight the problem inherent in the strict enforcement of the 
election-of-remedies rule adopted by the Sixth Circuit in Dewey. 
Implementation of the Meltzer view by the many arbitrators who 
share it,225 coupled with a binding election-of-remedies rule, would 
indeed pose a serious threat to title VII rights. 
224. Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology, Law and Labor Arbitration, 34 U. CHI. 
L. REv. 545, 557 (1967). For an excellent discussion summarizing the divergent views of 
arbitrators on this subject, see Sovern, When Should Arbitrators Follow Federal Law, 
in THE ExPANDING RoLE OF NEUTRALS 29 (A. Somers ed. 1970). 
225. In arbitration cases that involve alleged acts of employment discrimination 
that are cognizable under both a contract grievance procedure and under title VII, 
arbitrators hold widely divergent views concerning the extent to which public-policy 
considerations should affect the outcome of the contract grievance dispute. In the 
"typical" employment discrimination case, the arbitrator handles the issue of dis-
criminaton in the context of the collective agreement and makes no reference to re-
lated state or federal laws. See, e.g., Lockheed Georgia Co., 54 Lab. Arb. 769 (1970); 
Eastex, Inc., 70-2 CCH LAB . .ARB. AWARDS ,i 8636 (1970); Dewey-Portland Cement Co., 
43 Lab. Arb. 165 (1964). A preponderance of the cases in which the application of title 
VII or some state law is raised by one side or the other seems to support the rule that 
an arbitrator has no business interpreting or applying a public statute in a contract 
grievance dispute. See, e.g., Western Airlines, Inc., 54 Lab. Arb. 600 {1970); United 
Airlines, Inc., 48 Lab. Arb. 727 (1967); Pitman-Moore Div., 49 Lab. Arb. 709 (1967); 
Eaton Mfg. Co., 47 Lab. Arb. 1045 (1966); Stanley Works, 39 Lab. Arb. 374 (1962); 
Bethlehem Steel Co., 24 Lab. Arb. 699 (1955); Douglas &: Lomason Co., 23 Lab. Arb. 812 
(1954); Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 23 Lab. Arb. 606 (1954); Morton Salt Co., 21 Lab. 
Arb. 797 (1953); International Harvester Co., 17 Lab. Arb. 29 (1951). The most common 
exception to this majority view is the rule that the arbitrator should not order the 
company or union to do something that is clearly unlawful. For example, if a state 
law prohibits female employees from working in jobs that require the lifting of more 
than twenty-five pounds, the arbitrator will not order the company to promote a 
female candidate to the job in dispute, even if she is the senior qualified employee. 
Canton Provision Co., 52 Lab. Arb. 942 (1969). Under this view, the contract is said to 
be modified by the applicable statute. See, e.g., Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 54 Lab. Arb. 
320 (1969); Capital Mfg. Co., 50 Lab. Arb. 669 (1968); Great Atl. &: Pac. Tea Co., 49 
Lab. Arb. 1186 (1967); Ingraham Co., 48 Lab. Arb. 884 (1966); Schaefer Supermarkets, 
Inc., 46 Lab. Arb. ll5 (1966). Another common exception to the majority view is found 
when the parties have, by submission, conferred jurisdiction upon the arbitrator to 
decide the contract issue in the light of applicable federal or state law. See, e.g., Super 
Valu Stores, Inc., 52 Lab. Arb. II2 (1968); Morton Salt Co., 21 Lab. Arb. 797 (1953). 
Some arbitrators have extended the majority view by holding that if the parties have 
intentionally adopted a contract clause pursuant to an existing statute, with the object 
of incorporating the body of public law into the contract, then the arbitrator may 
properly refer to the applicable statute and any regulations or decisions thereunder in 
attempting to ascertain the meaning of the contract clause in issue. See, e.g., Dayton 
Tire &: Rubber Co., 55 Lab. Arb. 357 (1970); Weyerhauser Co., 54 Lab. Arb. 857 (1970); 
Manchester Gas Co., 53 Lab. Arb. 329 (1969); Weirton Steel Co., 50 Lab. Arb. 795 (1968). 
The new and, thus far, minority view in employment discrimination cases holds 
that collective bargaining agreements include by reference all public law applicable 
thereto; hence, the arbitrator should apply constitutional, statutory, and common law 
to aid in the resolution of any grievance dispute. See, e.g., Avco Corp., 54 Lab. Arb. 
165 (1970); Simoniz Co., 70-1 CCH LAB • .ARB. AWARDS 11 8024 (1969); Weirton Steel Co., 
50 Lab. Arb. 795 (1968); Hough Mfg. Corp., 51 Lab. Arb. 785 (1968). Under this new 
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Even when harmonizing the law and contractual intent is 
possible, not all arbitrators feel it incumbent on themselves to do so. 
The viewpoint of these arbitrators, however, conceives arbitration as 
too narrow a process. Arbitration agreements do not exist in a 
vacuum, but subsist in a world in which the law plays a significant 
part. Parties bargain against a background of rules and understand 
that these rules shall temper and color their contract. Therefore, 
sensible and responsible interpretation of the contract may at times 
require consideration of the surrounding body of law.226 The Su-
preme Court, in United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car 
Corporation,227 acknowledged the propriety of the arbitrator's draw-
ing on surrounding law "for guidance," although an award based 
solely upon enacted legislation would exceed his jurisdiction. In 
Hutchings, the Seventh Circuit said, "We do not mean to imply that 
employer obligations having their origin in Title VII are not to be 
incorporated into the arbitral process. When possible they should 
be."228 Nevertheless, what ought to be is not always coextensive with 
what is, and, when some arbitrators are not taking real cognizance of 
the law, the courts are understandably reluctant to hold that all 
arbitral awards apparently covering a title VII issue preclude the 
grievant's title VII remedies. 
Even if an arbitrator does look to title VII in the course of 
ascertaining the contractual intent, there is a legitimate fear that he 
will lack the expertise to deal adequately with the statutory require-
ments. For example, in Bowe, the plaintiff claimed that the employer 
was guilty of sex discrimination in restricting female employees to 
jobs that did not require lifting more than thirty-five pounds. A 
state law imposed a thirty-five-pound weight-lifting restriction on 
women. It cannot reasonably be expected that all arbitrators will 
possess the expertise to decide whether the employer's reliance on a 
state statute comports with the demands of title VII.229 Indeed, the 
district court succumbed to the argument, which the Seventh Circuit 
view, some arbitrators have even gone so far as to rule on the issue of federal pre-
emption when federal and state statutes were seemingly in conflict. The most fre-
quently recurring pre-emption problem has involved the clash between state laws that 
impose certain restrictions on the use of female labor and title VII, which proscribes 
"sex discrimination." See, e.g., Avco Corp., 54 Lab. Arb. 165 (1970); Simoniz Co., 70-1 
CCH LAB. ARB. AWARDS 1[ 8024 (1969) (federal law supersedes state laws); General Fire-
proofing Co., 48 Lab. Arb. 819 (1967) (title VII does not pre-empt state statutes). 
226. Stanley Works, 39 Lab. Arb. 374, 378 (1962). 
227. 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). 
228. 428 F.2d at 313. 
229. Compare Super Valu Stores, Inc., 52 Lab. Arb. 112 (1968) with Illinois Bell Tel. 
Co. v. Grabiec, 2 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. 945 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 1970) and Jones Metal 
Prods. Co. v. Walker, 2 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. 1113 (Ohio Ct. C.P. Nov. 19, 1970). 
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held to be erroneous,230 that state laws setting weight-lifting restric-
tions on women were not affected by title VII.231 If the district court 
misconceived the requirements of title VII's antidiscrimination pro-
visions, confidence can hardly be unhesitatingly reposed in the 
ability of arbitrators-many of whom are not lawyers-correctly to 
interpret the broad general language of title VII, which is susceptible 
to varied interpretations, or to make their way through the intricacies 
of the EEOC guidelines. 
In addition to the above arguments, there are some further 
practical considerations that militate against the election-of-remedies 
doctrine that was followed by the Sixth Circuit in Dewey. As sug-
gested earlier,232 the collective bargaining process is a uniquely 
tripartite arrangement, involving the rights and responsibilities of 
the individual employee, the union, and the employer. The rights 
of the individual, vis-a-vis the rights of the majority of the employees 
represented by the union, may of necessity be compromised-espe-
cially with respect to the processing of grievances under a collective 
agreement, in which case the Supreme Court has consistently granted 
a "wide range of reasonableness" to unions in handling individual 
employee complaints.233 A union has discretion, within the bounds 
of "fair representation" and "good faith," to drop, settle, or appeal 
to arbitration an individual's grievance, even though the rights of 
the individual may be sacrificed for the good of the majority.234 In 
Vaca v. Sipes,235 the Supreme Court emphasized that a union could 
properly settle a grievance short of arbitration, notwithstanding the 
fact that a court, upon hearing the merits of the claim, might sustain 
the individual's complaint: 
For if a union's decision that a particular grievance lacks sufficient 
merit to justify arbitration would constitute a breach of the duty of 
fair representation because a judge or jury later found the grievance 
meritorious, the union's incentive to settle such grievances short of 
arbitration would be seriously reduced. The dampening effect on the 
entire grievance procedure of this reduction of the union's freedom 
to settle claims in good faith would surely be substantial.236 
Since the union may lawfully decide to drop a grievance short 
230. 416 F.2d at 716. 
231. 272 F. Supp. at 364. 
232. See text accompanying notes 158-61 supra. 
233. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953). 
234. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 
(1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Black-Clawson Co. v. Machinists 
Lodge 355, 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962). 
235. 386 U.S. 171 (1967). 
236. 386 U.S. at 192-93. 
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of arbitration for reasons that may be wholly irrelevant to the merits 
of the claim being advanced by the individual,237 it certainly would 
not be reasonable to foreclose the title VII remedy to an aggrieved 
employee whose grievance has been settled to his detriment. The 
basic fallacy in the approach taken by the Sixth Circuit in Dewey, in 
adopting the election-of-remedies rule, is the assumption that the 
individual, rather than the union, determines the ultimate course 
of the grievance complaint. The collective bargaining process is 
premised on majority rule, whereas title VII sets forth certain 
statutory protections for the individual who is a member of a pro-
scribed minority. Given this difference, a union's decision with re-
spect to the processing of a contract claim should not be determina-
tive of statutory rights. 
In this same vein, other problems may be postulated. Suppose, 
for example, that the aggrieved individual initially urges the union 
to process his charge of discrimination under the contract against 
the company; but subsequently, after the grievance has been filed 
but before it has been appealed to arbitration, the employee decides 
that he would prefer to pursue his title VII remedy. If the union 
thereafter determines to appeal the case to arbitration under a con-
tract clause that gives the union the sole authority to appeal,238 is the 
employee to be precluded from advancing his claim under title VII? 
Further, suppose that the employee is unwilling to cooperate with 
the union in its presentation of the arbitration case; or suppose that 
the union, by the manner in which it presents the evidence, "sug-
gests" to the arbitrator that it considers the case to be a weak one.239 
Should the employee, under these circumstances, subsequently be 
foreclosed from filing suit under title VII? 
It would certainly seem that the above considerations weigh 
heavily against any rule that would prohibit an employee from 
bringing suit under title VII merely because the allegation of dis-
crimination has been raised under a contract grievance procedure. 
237. See generally Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Ad-
ministrative and Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MICH. L. 
R.Ev. 1435 (1963); Blumrosen, Legal Protection for Critical Job Interests: Union-Man-
agement Authority Versus Employee Autonomy, 13 RUTGERS L. R.Ev. 631 (1959); Cox, 
Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. R.Ev. 601 (1956); Hanslowe, The Collec• 
tive Agreement and the Duty of Fair Representation, 14 LAB. L.J. 1052 (1963); Lewis, 
Fair Representation in Grievance Administration: Vaca v. Sipes, 1967 SuP. CT. R.Ev. 
81; Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U. L. 
R.Ev. 362 (1962); Summers, Collective Power and Individual Rights in the Collective 
Agreement-A Comparison of Swedish and American Law, 72 YALE L.J. 421 (1963). 
238. See, e.g., Black-Clawson Co. v. Machinists Lodge 355, 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 
1962). 
239. See generally R. FLEMING, THE LABOR AluiITRATION PROCESS 107-33 (1965); 
Fleming, Some Problems of Due Process and Fair Procedure in Labor Arbitration, l!l 
STAN. L. R.Ev. 235 (1961); Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and 
Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 361, 403 (1962). 
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In fact, the question should not be posed under the heading of 
"election of remedies"; rather, the issue really concerns the extent 
to which a court in a title VII suit should give deference to an 
arbitrator's award under a collective bargaining contract.240 
While a strict election-of-remedies rule is wholly undesirable, 
neither would it serve any useful purpose for the courts freely to· 
permit an employee in a title VII suit to relitigate an issue after 
it has been decided against him by an arbitrator. To condone 
relitigation in all cases could easily threaten to undermine the effi-
cacy of the arbitration process. The vitality of arbitration depends, 
in no small measure, upon its final and binding quality. This vitality 
would be adversely affected if, for example, an employee were per-
mitted to relitigate a charge of discrimination under title VII after 
he had voluntarily pursued his contract remedy, after he was given 
rigorous and fair representation by the union, and after the contract 
antidiscrimination proscription was found to parallel that of title 
VII.2u 
Distilled to its essentials, the position of the Fifth and Seventh 
Circuits is that, although the national labor policy favoring resolu-
tion of industrial disputes by arbitration may argue in favor of an 
election-of-remedies doctrine, the strong public policy against dis-
crimination according to race, sex, or religion will not permit it. As 
has been shown, this judgment has considerable appeal in certain 
cases. When the arbitrator pays no heed to title VII considerations, or 
when for some reason his award does blatant violence to the purposes 
and policies of the Act, holding the plaintiff to an election of reme-
dies may well be undesirable. On the other hand, uniformly permit-
ting employees to have access to the courts after arbitration when the 
issue arbitrated is identical to the one the court must decide in a title 
VII suit is subversive of the arbitration process, extraordinarily 
burdensome on the defendant, and conducive to wastefully repe-
titious litigation. 
If the conflict is viewed abstractly as a clash between the policy 
favoring the private settlement of industrial disputes by arbitration 
and the policy condemning racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic dis-
crimination, there can be no doubt that the latter supersedes the 
former. But that viewpoint is outrageously simplistic. First, the im-
portance of arbitration in the national labor policy is too funda-
mental for the arbitral process to be so summarily undermined. 
Moreover, the resolution of discrimination claims by private and 
240. See generally Comment, The NLRB and Deference to Arbitration, 77 YALE L.J. 
1191-96 (1968). 
241. See Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 332, 337 (6th Cir. 1970). 
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even informal measures is directly in accord with the congressional 
intent in enacting title VII. As the Fifth Circuit stated in Hutchings: 
Title VII outlaws certain forms of discrimination of employment. 
An important method for the fulfillment of congressional purpose is 
the utilization of private grievance-arbitration procedures. This 
comports not only with the national labor policy favoring arbitra-
tion as the means for the final adjustment of labor disputes, e.g., 
The Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union, Local 770, 397 U.S. 
235 (1970) ... but also with the specific enforcement policy of Title 
VII that discrimination is better curtailed through voluntary com-
pliance with the Act than through court orders.242 
Finally and most significantly, simply because there is concurrent 
jurisdiction between the arbitral and statutory processes does not 
mean there is general disharmony between national policies. As has 
been stated, there is more often concordance than clash.243 
Consequently, showing some deference to arbitration seems no less 
appropriate as a solution here than it is when the jurisdiction of the 
arbitrator and the NLRB overlap. In such circumstances, the Board 
has adopted a policy of deferring to arbitration under the so-called 
Spielberg doctrine.244 Under that rule, the Board refuses to exercise 
its pre-emptory jurisdiction to set aside arbitration awards dealing 
with unfair labor practice charges, provided the arbitration proceed-
ings "have been fair and regular, all parties [have] agreed to be 
bound, and the decision of the [arbitrator] is not clearly repugnant to 
the purposes and policies of the Act."245 A doctrine analogous to that 
formulated in Spielberg might constitute the best solution to the 
problems presented by the concurrent jurisdiction of the grievance 
procedure and the courts in title VII cases. 
The possibility of such a solution was acknowledged in Hutch-
ings, in which the court said, "we leave for the future the question 
whether a procedure similar to that applied by the Labor Board in 
deferring to arbitration awards when certain standards are met 
might properly be adopted in Title VII cases."246 That the time is 
ripe for consideration of such a procedure is indicated by the court's 
remark that it was only because of the "state of the record" that it 
passed over the question.247 
While the Spielberg approach seems well suited for adoption in 
242. 428 F.2d at 313. 
243. See note 204 supra and accompanying text. 
244. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). See also Joseph Schlitz Brewing 
Co., 175 NL.R.B. 23 (1969). 
245. 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082. 
246. 428 F.2d at 314 n.10. 
247. 428 F.2d at 314 n.10. 
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title VII cases, there may be additional safeguards that should be 
added to the rule in order to make it truly functional. Spielberg 
arose under the NLRA, which is premised on the notion of major-
ity rule and exclusive representation by the designated bargaining 
agent,248 whereas title VII is concerned primarily with protecting 
the rights of individuals who are in certain specified minority cate-
gories. Therefore, to ensure the full statutory protections intended, 
the courts in title VII suits should only give deference to an arbitra-
tor's award when the following conditions have been satisfied: 
(1) the arbitration hearing has been fair and regular; 
(2) the union, employer, and employee would otherwise be 
bound by the decision of the arbitrator under the applicable 
collective bargaining contract; 
(3) the employee has voluntarily participated in the arbitra-
tion proceeding-that is, the employee has not resisted the 
union's efforts in his behalf; 
(4) the employee has been apprised by the union that a 
decision by the arbitrator adverse to his claim may subsequently 
foreclose relief under title VII; 
(5) the employee has been fairly and adequately represented; 
(6) the arbitrator has found that the contract proscribes 
discrimination as defined by title VII; 
(7) the arbitrator has considered and fully decided the charge 
of discrimination under the applicable antidiscrimination con-
tract clause; 
(8) the employee has been given the option of using his own 
counsel to present his case to the arbitrator; and 
(9) the arbitrator's decision is not clearly repugnant to the 
purposes and policies of title VII.249 
On the other hand, there should be no deference given to a con-
tractual arbitration procedure if: 
(1) the alleged charge of discrimination has not been ap-
pealed to arbitration; or 
(2) the grievance has been settled without the employee's 
consent; or 
(3) the arbitrator holds against the employee but either (i) 
248. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 321 (1944). 
249. Thus, for example, if the courts have recognized the present effects of past 
willful acts as constituting "discrimination by intent" under title VII (see, e.g., Local 
189, Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 
919 (1970); United States v. !BEW, Local 38, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1970)), then an 
arbitrator's contrary rule should not be respected. 
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does so for reasons other than the alleged discrimination or (ii) 
gives no reason or justification for his award;250 or 
(4) the employer is unable to show that the employee's claim 
of discrimination has been fully and fairly litigated in the arbi-
tration hearing. 
I£ these standards were given uniform recognition by the courts 
under a "deferral rule," they would adequately serve to protect the 
aggrieved individual under title VII and, at the same time, to pro-
tect the sanctity and binding quality of the collective bargaining 
arbitration process. 
Given this type of a deferral doctrine, the question arises who 
will formulate and administer it. In theory, nothing should prevent 
the courts from doing so; but, as a practical matter, the threshold 
investigation required could too easily tum into a full-blown trial 
on the merits-precisely what is sought to be avoided. Moreover, 
unless the Supreme Court lays down the criteria under which a 
plaintiff's suit will be barred out of deference to arbitration, there is 
likely to be undesirable variance among the circuits. 
The logical body to formulate a deferral rule is obviously the 
EEOC. Yet, under the present statutory scheme of title VII, such 
action by ili:_e EEOC would be unlikely. Section 706(e) of the Act 
provides that the Commission "shall" send the aggrieved party a 
letter permitting him to bring suit within thirty days if "the Com-
mission has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance with this 
title."251 One might argue that the Commission could, under the 
standards proposed above, consider an arbitration award to be a 
voluntary compliance and thus selectively limit the party's ability to 
sue by not issuing a suit letter in appropriate cases. However, the 
Commission views its statutory powers as inadequate to prevent a 
party from bringing an action if the party himself rejects the settle-
ment.252 Moreover, it has been held that the scheme of title VII does 
not prevent a private party from bringing suit if the party does not 
agree with the settlement agreed upon by the EEOC and the em-
ployer}~53 This result comports with the failure of Congress to grant 
enforcement power to the EEOC and with the legislative history of 
the Act, which indicates that it was not the intention of Congress to 
250. "Arbitrators have no obligation to the Court to give their reasons for an 
award" (Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &: Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960) ), and 
therefore the employee should not be precluded from "relitigation" on his statutory 
claim if the arbitrator does not make it clear that the title Vll issue has been re-
solved. 
251. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1964). 
252. See text accompanying note 123 supra. 
253. See notes 124-26 supra and accompanying text. 
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place the Commission in the courthouse door.254 Consequently, as 
matters now stand, the Commission would be unable to bar an 
aggrieved employee from bringing an action in federal court by 
ruling that an arbitration award is conclusive of his rights. The Com-
mission has indicated a willingness to defer consideration of charges 
lodged with it, pending arbitration up to the statutory time limits;255 
but, obviously, this type of delay would be of no consequence if the 
arbitration award were issued within the time limits but was unsatis-
factory to the charging party. On the other hand, if the EEOC were 
granted cease-and-desist powers, it would then be the logical agency 
to create deferral rules. 
State FEP commissions that have enforcement powers are perhaps 
in a better position than the EEOC to defer selectively to arbitration 
awards, but section 706(b) of the Civil Rights Act requires in most 
cases that the EEOC defer action on the charge to the state or local 
agencies for only sixty days.256 Hence, despite the existence of an arbi-
tration award that the state FEP commission could treat as conclu-
sive, such a state procedure would in no way foreclose the possibility 
of a title VII suit. 
Therefore, until the Supreme Court renders a decision in this 
area, the whole question of election of remedies and the effect of title 
VII on the arbitration process will be unresolved. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The prohibitions against discrimination in employment, and 
specifically the ban on religious discrimination, embodied in title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 comprise a noble venture. The temp-
tation in implementing that venture, of course, is to paint with 
broad strokes. But the delicate relationship between the religious 
and the secular calls for a precision of analysis in the title VII field 
which, if the legal ·wranglings in Dewey are any example, has been 
seriously wanting to date. 
To say that the definition of discrimination is one of effect is 
surely to prove too much, and the notion of accommodation is no 
less troublesome. Such formulas may turn a few to religious conver-
sion; however, they will also undoubtedly have disruptive effects on 
the uniform administration of collective bargaining contracts. Even 
assuming these problems to be less grave than here portrayed, still it 
254. See note 127 supra. 
255. Opinion Letter of EEOC General Counsel, Oct. 20, 1966, in BNA LAB. PoLICY 
&: PRAC. 401:3028 (1966). 
256. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1964). This section also provides that the sixty-day 
period shall be extended to 120 days during the first year after the effective date of the 
state or local FEP law. 
654 Michigan Law Review 
is difficult to fathom the apparent subjugation of the secular to the 
religious by the rule of accommodation formulated by the EEOC2117 
in conjunction with religious-discrimination cases under title VII. 
The EEOC rule is a curious departure from the traditional view that 
"we must accommodate our idiosyncrasies, religious as well as secu-
lar, to the compromises necessary in communal life .•.. "2118 
Equally disturbing is the enunciation of the election-of-remedies 
doctrine by the Sixth Circuit in Dewey259 in its aborted attempt to 
glean the proper perspective for the arbitration process in the han-
dling of title VII claims. While some deferral rule may indeed be 
warranted under certain circumstances260 in order to strike a work-
able balance between the role of the arbitrators and the courts in the 
adjudication of title VII claims, surely Dewey-in which the issue of 
the alleged title VII claim was never really litigated in arbitration261 
-was not the proper setting for resort to this principle of law. Fur-
thermore, there is the more troublesome question, which was ignored 
by the Sixth Circuit, whether arbitrators should be entrusted with 
the final and binding adjudication of alleged title VII claims, espe-
cially when no legal safeguards presently exist to protect individual 
claimants who may be adversely affected by the invocation of the 
election-of-remedies doctrine. 
VII. POSTSCRIPT 
On January 18, 1971, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Company.262 The two questions presented 
to the Court for final determination are: (I) Does an employer en-
gage in religious discrimination in violation of section 703(a)(l) of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act if he refuses to make reasonable accommo-
dations to an employee's religious observance of a weekly day of rest? 
(2) Is an employee who has sought arbitration of his claim for wrong-
ful discharge under a labor agreement barred from bringing a Civil 
Rights Act suit arising out of the same discharge?263 
257 See note 44 supra. 
258. Otten v. :Baltimore & O.R.R., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953). See also Stimpel v. 
California State Personnel :Bd., 6 Cal. App. 3d 206, 85 Cal. Rptr. 797, cert. denied, 400 
U.S. 952 (1970). 
259. 429 F.2d at 331-32. 
260. See notes 246-50 supra and accompanying text. 
261. 291 F. Supp. at 789. 
262. 39 U.S.L.W. 3313 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1971) (No. 835). 
263. 39 U.S.L.W. 3250 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1970) (No. 835). 
